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PREFACE

All of the great leaders have had one characteristic
in common:
it was the willingness to confront
unequivocally the major anxiety of their people in
their time. This, and not much else, is the essence
of leadership. 1
Labor and management in the steel industry have been and
remain

historically

conflict has
intervention.

usually

in

conflict

erupted

with

into

each

strikes

other.
and

This

government

The mid-1940's were a time when both parties

were trying to develop a working and living relationship.
Individuals
historically

involved
been

in

labor-management

"unique

individuals."

situations

have

They

been

have

leaders who have been able to create a vision and inspire
others to share that vision.
of which history is made.

These are the types of leaders

If one were to do a study on any

one particular person, be it management or labor, during these
early years, there would be many individuals who would have
interesting and exciting stories to tell.
The steel industry was very volatile between 1939-1944.
Inland Steel was no exception.

Strikes and workers discontent

1

John Kenneth Galbraith, The Age of Uncertainty (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin co., 1977), 330.
ii

were

the

product

of

the

environment.

The

workers

were

responding to managements' demand to increase production, with
a lack of concern for the person.

The companies, in turn were

responding aggressively to employee demands.

The union's

success in organizing the steelworker was due to the fact that
the working conditions were poor.

Wages, benefits, safety and

the racial integration in the workforce were all major issues
which needed to be addressed.
by management.

These were, however, ignored

Inland Steel's

was very dictatorial. 2

Due

to a high turnover rate in management during the years 19391944, employees' morale and trust in the company was virtually
non-existent.

The Chicago plant had six managers during this

time period.

In a two year time-span,

personnel

managers.

Management

the plant had ten

instilled

the

belief

in

supervisors that the best way to maintain productivity and
discipline was to have employee's

afraid of

losing their

jobs. 3
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution
of labor-management relations, industrial policies and race
relations at

Inland Steel,

from

1945-1969.

Other policy

issues, such as those of wages and social insurance programs
(e.g. accident pay, life insurance, pensions, etc.), deserve
further

investigation.

These

2

issues

however,

are

not

William Foote Whyte, Pattern For Industrial Peace (New
Harper & Bros., 1951), 157.

York:
3

Ibid.

I

8.
iii

examined in this thesis.•
This thesis was initially intended to be a biographical
oral history of Mr. William G. Caples who was employed at
Inland steel from 1945, until his retirement in 1969.

Due to

his untimely death, the focus changed to an examination of
labor-management and race relations policies in the steel
industry,
Inland

and

in particular,
Several

Steel.

interviewed. 5

an oral historical study of

former

Inland

employees

were

The information gathered from these interviews

highlighted the fact that Inland's success story in the area
of

race

relations

was

due

to

the

commitment

of

upper

management and to those individuals willing to take risks,
such as Mr.
support,

Caples.

developed

Mr.
the

Caples,
mechanisms

with upper management's
to

address

the

race

relations problems regarding the integration of the workforce

4

The author recognizes the fact that during this time
period the strikes which occurred were many times economic.
From 1937-1961 wages were the focal point of contract
negotiations.
("Inland Steel wage chronology," typewritten
(revised/updated to April 15, 1963) Section I, 1-12.)
The
issue of pensions and other social insurance programs being
subject to collective bargaining were also of great importance
and merit in-depth studies unto themselves.
For example,
Inland's case on pension's is one which is well documented
because it was the case which decided pensions would be
subject to collective bargaining. (Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB,
77 NLRB 1, enforced 170 F.2d 247 (1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 960 (1949).
5

Pete Calecci, interview by author, 2 August 1989, East
Chicago, IN, tape recording;
Frank Cassel, interview by
author, 4 October 1989, Evanston, IL, tape recording;
Bill
Dillon, interview by author, 8 September 1989, Chicago, IL,
tape recording;
Bill Lowry, interview by author, 13 July
1989, Chicago, IL, tape recording.
iv

at Inland steel.

Mr. Caples paved the way for change, as did

other national leaders.

It is human nature to remember the

George Wallace's and issues like segregation and the nightmare
of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.
Dr.

King left us a

People like

legacy and had a major effect on the
On a smaller

evolution of race relations in this country.

scale there were many other individuals who were also paving
the way for the changes which came about.

William G. Caples

was one of these individuals.
Mr. Caples joined Inland in 1945, just as management and
the

union

were

relationship.

beginning

to

develop

a

more

cooperative

He played a significant part in changing the

relationship between union and management into more of a
positive one.

Mr. Caples also played a major role in the

evolution of race and industrial relations policies which were
beginning during this time period.

One year after Mr. Caples

was

Staff

hired

into

the

position

of

Assistant

to

the

President, he became the first Industrial Relations Manager.
His goal was to assist in the development and implementation
of

labor

relation

policies

and

to

improve

relationship with the Steelworkers union.
Assistant

to

management.
Steelworkers

the

President,

The

relationship

union

was

he

one

had

Inland

which

the

the

company's

Having been Staff
support

developed

involved

both

of

top

with

the

parties

commitment to work together and give all workers an equal
opportunity.

v

In examining industrial relations policies, one must take
into

account

not

only

the

people

involved,

government, management and union leadership,
industrial relations system itself.

employees,

but also the

Because the focus of this

thesis centers around the steel industry, and Inland Steel,
the industrial relations system and the environment in which
it

evolved

is

explored.

This

thesis

is

an

in-depth

examination and analysis of the industrial relations system
at Inland Steel.

Race relations during this time period are

also explored in relationship to labor-management relations
and industrial relations policies.

The external environment

played a major role in the evolution of labor-management
relations, but if it had not been for the foresight, vision
and innovation of individuals such as William Caples, changes
would have taken much longer.
Many events occurred which led to the integration of the
workforce in the steel industry.

The Steelworkers Organizing

Committee (SWOC) held their first convention on December 14,
1937. 6

Delegates adopted eight objectives for the

swoc.

The

first one was as follows:
To unite in one organization, regardless of race,
creed, color or nationality, all workmen and working
women eligible for membership, employed in and
around iron and steel manufacturing, processing, and
fabricating mills and factories of the American

6

Vincent D. Sweeney, United Steelworkers Of America:
-=T"""w.. ,.e"""n....t...,y.___,Y....e~a=r=-=s-=L=a...,.t...e'-=-r ( Pittsburgh:
United Steel workers of
America), 40.
vi

continent. 7
It was

several

years

later that the government took

action in the employment area.

on June 25, 1941, President

Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, which established a
Fair Employment

Practice Committee

investigate

complaints

appropriate

steps"

to

of

(FEP)

to

discrimination"

obtain

"receive
and
In

compliance.'

to

and

"take

1942,

the

congress of Industrial Organizations established a Committee
to Abolish Racial Discrimination. 9

That same year, when the

swoc became the United Steelworkers of America not one black10
steelworker

was

appointed

international union. 11

to

any

major

position

At this same convention,

in

the

more than

twenty locals submitted resolutions against discrimination in
the mills and Jim Crow laws in the South. 12

At the same time

they were adopting these anti-discrimination resolutions, they
were

providing

7

black

delegates

with

a

list

of

"colored

Ibid., 42.

'Herbert Hill, Black Labor And The American Legal System
Volume I: Race. Work. and the Law (Washington, D.C.: Bureau
of National Affairs, 1977), 179.
9

Phillips s. Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker
1619-1973 (New York: Praeger, 1974), 256.
10

Black - a person with origins in any of the black racial
groups of Africa.
11

Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 263.

12

Paul F. Clark, Peter Gottlieb and Donald Kennedy, eds.,
Forging a Union of Steel (New York: ILR Press New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1987), 60. vii

hotels."

These are but a few examples of how unions and the

government manifested their feelings,

real or not,

against

racism.
The

CIO

had

a

stronger

stand

against

racial

discrimination than the AFL and did not exonerate unions which
excluded minority workers.

By 1944 the black union members,

desiring the same considerations in the workplace as the white
union members,

were ready for a

change.

companies began to develop more of a

Both unions and

"social conscience."

some felt hiring blacks was the right thing to do,

while

others were forced to abide by the laws which were passed.
In any case, changes began, but they could not have been made
without the support and guidance of individuals.

At Inland

Steel

Yet

Mr.

corporate

Caples

lead

environment,

the

drive

behind

for

every

change.
such

leader

in

is

a

the

support, or lack thereof, of the corporation.
This research project is different from others, in that
it is an oral case history of Inland Steel.

Mr.

William

Caples and the management at Inland Steel made a contribution
during

this

time.

The

policies

Mr.

Caples

assisted

in

formulating and implementing in the industrial relations and
human resources area and the situation at this company after
1948, have not been documented.

In Pattern For. Industrial

Peace ( 1951), William Foote Whyte wrote about labor-management
relations between Inland and the local steelworkers union.
This however, only covered the period 1937-1948.
viii

This thesis

will cover the years between 1945-1969 which were a turning
point in labor-management and race relations policies, both
in the steel industry, and at Inland Steel.

It was during Mr.

Caples tenure that a more positive relationship between the
steelworkers union and management developed.
wrote

David McDonald

"Inland was the maverick of the steel

independent company with individual attitudes.

industry,
1113

an

Whether it

was establishing eight hour work days when the industry was
not yet prepared to do so, or whether it was the last one to
agree or disagree in matters regarding collective bargaining,
Inland

did

make

These

changes.

changes

could

not

have

happened without people who were committed and William Caples
was one of these individuals.

13

David J. McDonald, Union Man (New York:
Co . , 19 6 9 ) , 3 o4 .
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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY
PRIOR TO 1945
Industrial

relations

dramatically up to 1945.

in

the

steel

Dunlop have

evolved

These early years of the industry

set the stage for what was yet to come.
John T.

industry

Thomas Kochan, and

both done comprehensive research and

published extensively in the industrial and labor relations
area. 14

John T. Dunlop deserves mention because he coined the

phrase "industrial relations.

1115

Dunlop, as Kochan, provides

a theoretical framework to better understand the workings of
the industrial relations system.

Kochan however,

has one

14

See,
for example,
John T.
Dunlop and Neil W.
Chamberlain, eds., Frontiers in Collective Bargaining (New
York:
Harper & Row, 1967); Thomas A. Kochan, Collective
Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Homewood, IL: Richard
D. Irwin, 1980); Thomas A. Kochan, Daniel J. Mitchell and Lee
Dyer, eds., Industrial Relations Research In The 1970' s Review
And Appraisal (Madison: Industrial Relations Research Assoc. ,
1982); Harry c. Katz, Shifting Gears:
Changing Labor
Relations in the U.S. Auto Industry (Cambridge:
MIT Press,
1985);
John
T.
Dunlop,
"The
Development
of
Labor
Organizations:
A Theoretical Framework, 11 in Insights into
Labor Issues, Richard A. Lester and Joseph Shister, eds., (New
York: MacMillan Co., 1948), 163-193.
1

York:

~ohn

Thomas Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (New
Holt, 1958).
1

2

major criticism with

Dunlop's model.

He believes Dunlop

originally allowed for the absence of a "shared ideology. 1116
Kochan also contends that Dunlop failed to pursue this in any
of his later research.ll Kochan states that Dunlop's later
research provides analysis and sets forth the assumption that
a shared ideology prevailed in the post-New Deal environment
in the United States. 18

Kochan emphasizes that it is the

absence of a shared ideology which explains the changes of the
United States industrial relations systems over time.
The framework of both of these theories do have some
similarities.

Kochan, as Dunlop, considers how the external

environment affects the relationship.

They both identified,

(1) technology, (2) labor markets and (3) public policies as
being a part of the setting in which industrial relations
systems interact. 19

Kochan has added to this ( 4) workforce

characteristics and values and (5) product markets.
1 is Kochan's model of the framework which he uses.

Figure
One can

16

Shared ideology is a set of similar beliefs, ideas or
values which are shared by people.
In corporations
individuals are equally committed to the company's goals and
objectives.
17

Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems, Ft. Note 7, 254.

Ibid. , and Thomas A. Kochan, Harry c. Katz and Robert
B. McKersie, The Transformation of American Industrial
Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 11.
19

3

FIGURE 1 20
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

- 1

-Labor Markets
-Workforce Characteristics and Values
-Product Markets
-Technology
-Public Policy

History and
Current
Structures

Values
and
Business Strategies

,

,,

(

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF FIRM-LEVEL
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

---7

Strategic Activities
Collective Bargaining
Personnel Functional
Activities

~

Workplace Activities

J

J

1

PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES
Employers
Workers
Labor Unions
Society

2

°Kochan, The
Relations, 11.

Transformation

of

American

Industrial

4

see that it is much more extensive and thorough because it
incorporates the external environment, values, history and
business strategies.

It also allows for responses to certain

actions taken in the external environment and how these in
turn affect what the final outcome will be in any given
situation.
Dunlop has also identified three "acto;rs" which need to
be present in any industrial relations system:

(1) managers,

( 2)

Due to their

workers and

interaction

in

( 3)
the

government agencies. ll
environment,

these

"actors"

are

the

catalysts in the evolution of an industrial relations system.
Kochan has also identified these three characters, but has
further

divided

structure."

them

into

a

"three

tier

institutional

In this structure each of the three characters

or "actors" are divided into three levels:

(1) the top level,

which does the long-term planning and policy making; (2) the
middle level which does the collective bargaining or personnel
policy making;

and

( 3)

the lower level,

which are those

affected by the policies on a day-to-day basis.ll
Steel Industry and the Industrial Relations System:
Kochan's Model
The steel industry's industrial relations system can best
be understood and analyzed by using Kochan' s model.

The

uDunlop, Industrial Relations systems, 7.
llKochan, The
Relations, 16.

Transformation

of

American

Industrial

5

interaction among employers, the union and government can be
best explained when one considers the environment and events
which have taken place.

Going one step further,

Kochan' s

three tier structure provides for a much clearer picture of
how the

three

levels

in

union,

companies

and

government

developed and carried out policies.
The industrial relations system of the steel industry was
formed in the late 1800's, when competition was intense and
technology was

rapidly

progressing.

It was

a

time when

steelmakers concerns were costs and improvements; labor was
looked on as a

cost of production;

and trade unions were

becoming established while meeting more resistance in the
steel mills.

During its early years of expansion, the steel

industry depended on a supply of cheap labor.

Prior to World

War I, much of this need in the North was met by European
immigrants and in the South it was met with the black worker.
In 1907 it was reported that blacks made up 39.1 percent of
all the steelworkers in the South as opposed to 1.5 percent
in the East and O. 5 percent in the Midwest. 23

Between 1908 and

1913 companies now had a stable workforce and had initiated
safety and welfare programs, thus successfully keeping unions
out.

As unions grew weaker, mechanization also increased, in

turn making the skilled working man replaceable.

23

Advancement

Sterling D. Spero and Abram L. Harris, The Black Worker
(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1968), 246, as cited
in the Report of the United States Commission on Immigration,
1907, Vol. 8, 34.

6

was reaching a level where it no longer depended on experience
or special skills, so the union could offer no protection to
those being replaced by machines.
world

war

I

changed

the

situation.

As

immigration

slowed, the labor shortage increased, causing worker unrest
and strikes.

One way steel companies tried to decrease this

labor shortage and alleviate the situation was to increase
wages.

This was not successful because it did not keep up
Companies looking for another source of

with the economy.

labor, found it with the black migrant worker.

Integrating

the black worker into companies with a predominantly white
workforce was to become a major concern.
years

and several

pieces of

It would take many

legislation before the black

worker would experience some semblance of equality in the
workplace and in unions.
Steel mills had some experience with the black worker
because in the past, blacks frequently had been employed as
strikebreakers. 24
mills.

A few were retained after the strikes in the

The mills began recruiting in the South, and it was

at a time when the Southern black was ready to migrate.

In

1914 black agricultural workers in the South were earning
$1.13 per day. 25

These low wages, along with the living and

2

•oaniel Guerin, 100 Years of Labor in the USA (London:
Ink Links, 1979), 145-153.
25

U.S. Census Bureau, statistical Abstract of the United
States. 1920 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1920), 303.

7

farming conditions and the racial discrimination were the
impetus to go North.

In many instances, company officials

feared the reaction of white employees so these steel firms
hesitated to hire these migrants.
them

provided

segregated

inadequate facilities.
people,

continued

to

housing

Blacks,
be

The employers who did hire
with

high

rents

and

considered to be inferior

placed

in

positions

requiring

unskilled labor.
Immigrants, who had been working in the steel mills since
the late 1800's, began to be noticed by their employers.
continued

labor

shortage

began

attitude toward this steelworker.

to

change

employers'

companies began to see the

immigrant steelworker in a different light.
grew in the eyes of the employers,
began to change.

the

The

As their status

treatment towards them

The opportunity to rent company houses was

given to those who were seeking American citizenship.

This

in addition to English classes, and continued wage increases,
proved to be successful attempts in making the immigrant a
permanent employee.
World War I and the Black Worker
When the United States entered World War I in 1917, steel
was a

necessity and a

labor shortage occurred.

brought back the longer work schedules.

The war

Seven days of work,

which had for the most part been eliminated by 1915, and the
twelve hour day which had been somewhat

restrict~d,

were

8

utilized.

Living conditions deteriorated and even though

there were wage increases, they did not keep up with food,
fuel and rent increases.

By 1917 food costs had increased by

fifty-seven percent, fuel twenty-four percent and housing by
nine percent. 26
President

Wilson,

sympathetic

to

the

plight

of

the

workers and the labor shortage, improved the possibility of
unionization. 27

In April 1918, the War Labor Conference Board

was created giving the workers the right to organize without
interference

from

Later

employers.

that

same

year,

the

President transformed the Conference Board into the National
War Labor Board, giving them the power to settle disputes in
essential industries.
the

national

labor

The War Labor Policies Board completed
Their

program.

purpose was

to

avoid

disputes by standardizing wages, hours and conditions in war
industries.
The United States experienced a post World War I boom
which lasted from 1919 to 1920.

Many assumed this postwar

prosperity would be permanent but economic conditions began
to

worsen.

By

1920

8,881

businesses

had

failed,

with

liabilities of $295 million; and in 1921 this number increased

U. s. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United
States. 1925 (Washington, o.c.: GPO, 1925), 322.
26

27

Mel vin
I.
Urofsky,
Big
Steel
and
the
Wilson
Administration (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969),
258.

9

to 19,652 , involving $755 million. 28

With nearly 3.5 million

people out of work, the country faced for the first time in
many

years,

companies

a

serious

resisted

problem

unions

feeling they were betrayed.

unemployment. 29

of

attempts,

leaving

Steel

steelworkers

This discontent erupted into the

strike of 1919 which began in September, 1919.
Blacks, who had been migrating to the northern industrial
areas,

came from largely rural areas and had virtually no

experience with unions.
the steel companies

In October they began appearing in

as strike breakers.

It is estimated that

between 30-40 thousand were brought into the industry during
this time. 30
steel

The strike ended on January 8, 1920 with the

companies

occurrence

that

winning.
efforts

It

was

commenced

not
to

until

after

organize

the

this
black

worker.
The labor supply gradually started to increase, not only
with blacks but also with Mexicans.

That same year the census

showed that blacks made up 11.4 per cent of the steel labor
force in Illinois. 31

The importation of Mexicans also began

28

John D. Hicks, George E. Mowry, and Robert E. Burke, The
American Nation, 4th ed., (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1965), 471.

30

Richard B. Morris, ed. , Bicentennial History of the
American Worker (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor,
1976)' 170.
31

David Brody, Steelworkers in America:
(New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 266.

The Nonunion Era,

10
to spread in the steel industry.

By 1925, they made up 11.7

percent

in

of

the

steel

workforce

the

Chicago

district,

providing the industry with more than an adequate unskilled
labor group. 32

The employment situation improved to what it

had been prior to World War I.
of

unskilled

workers

and

There was again a new group

movement

upward

in

jobs.

The

worker's dependence on management for jobs was as it had been
in the past.
a

shortage

There was an oversupply of unskilled workers and
of

demand

for

unskilled

workers,

thus

steel

companies were again in power.
National Industrial Recovery Act
In 1933 Franklin
he came to office.
federal
involved

relief

Roo~evelt

confronted the Depression when

One of his priority's was to devise a new

policy program.

through

the

passage

Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933. 33

The government again got
of

the

National

Industrial

President Roosevelt described

this piece of legislation as being a cooperative effort where
labor and companies could participate in order to facilitate
the recovery of the national economy.

The purpose of the Act

was to increase the total national purchasing power and to
restore jobs to the unemployed.

33

It hoped to accomplish this

National Industrial Recovery Act, 1933 Public Law 67,
73rd Congress June 16, 1933.
National Industrial Recovery
Act; Act of June 16, 1933, C.90, 48 Stat. 195, 196; 15 u.s.c.
703. The Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitutional in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

11
by:

( 1)

reducing

working

hours

with

the

intention

of

increasing employment; (2) increasing wages; (3) encouraging
collective bargaining through representative of employees own
choosing;

(4)

allowing industries to coordinate,

eliminate

unfair competition, and introduce some measure of economic
planning. 34

In return for the government holding back the

Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 35 employers were to increase wages and
extend labor the right to organize.
Under

the

NIRA,

each

industry,

through

its

trade

associations, wrote codes which they presented to the National
Recovery Administration for approval.

It was assumed that

each code would be the product of the given industry, with
input from management, labor and the consumer.
was not to be the case.
were

to

be

pertaining
established
district.

It soon became clear that the codes

developed
to

wages

rates

of

However, this

by

the

was

very

pay

which

industry.

The

involved.
varied

provision

The

from

industry

district

to

Their reason for these wage differentials were

stated in the code as being due to the difference in the cost
of

living and economic conditions of certain areas.

Administration

had

been

forced

to

compromise

on

The

several

34

H.R. Cayton and G.S. Mitchell, Black Workers and the New
Unions (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press,
1939), 90. Also see Hill, Black Labor and the American Legal
System.
Sherman Act, 26 stat. 209 ( 1890), as amended, 15 U. s. c.
1 et seq. ( 19 8 2 ) .
35

§

§
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points.

When the steel companies expressed their willingness

to include Section 7A into their code,

the Administration

accepted the wage differential.
In May 1935, the courts ruled the NIRA unconstitutional 36
and this was followed one month later by the passage of the
National Labor Relations Act, 37 which reformulated Section 7 (A)
of the NIRA.

The NLRA authorized the creation of the National

Labor Relations Board, who would:
have the power to certify unions
as exclusive bargaining agents;
to order elections among competing
unions so that workers could choose a
collective bargaining agent or "no union";
and to insure that after a union was
certified as the exclusive representative,
employers legally obliged to recognize
the union would engage in collective
bargaining. 38
Black

barring

racial

discrimination be included in this section of the Act.

During

this

time

leaders

the

insisted that

closed

shop,

also

a

clause

known

as

a

union

shop,

provided that all men employed in a plant had to join a union
either at the time of employment or soon after.

Blacks feared

a new law legalizing a closed shop, would require employers
to hire only union members.

36

The closed shop did not interfere

Schecter Poul try Corp. v. U.S. , 295 U.S. 495 ( 1935).

37

National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), 49
Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 65 Stat.
601 (1951), 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 73 Stat. 541 (1959); 29
u.s.c. Sections 151-68 (1970).
38

Hill, Black Labor and the American Legal System

104.
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with an employers right to hire or fire, but blacks felt if
an anti-discrimination clause were not included, it would lead
to their being denied union membership.
same as denying them employment.

This would be the

In the end the anti-

discrimination clause was not included.
In 1936 there were 85,000 black steelworkers, making up
20 percent of the laborers and 6 percent of the operators. 39
This time the National Negro Congress felt the best way to
help the black steelworker was by organizing and the Steel
Workers Organizing Committee welcomed their support.

At their

first convention one of the items on their agenda was to agree
'

to organize the steelworker regardless of race, color, creed,
nationality or sex. 40

By the end of 19 3 7 ,

the SWOC was

bargaining for 550,000 steel workers, in addition to which it
now had the largest group of black union workers in the United
States. 41

It succeeded in increasing wages, reducing work

hours and in some parts of the steel industry, it put an end
to Jim Crow practices.

Instances such as this would pave the

way for the integration of the workforce.
World War II
World War II brought a boom in industry . as defense
efforts got underway.

39

The defense industries absorbed all

Foner, organized Labor and the Black Worker, 218.

40

Sweeney, United Steel workers of America, 4 o.

41

Ibid., 224.
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available white worker's yet their color ban remained.

Many

labor unions in the defense industries would not admit blacks.
Management with closed-shop agreements 42 would turn down black
applicants for being nonunion.

A. Phillip Randolph who had

been president of the National Negro Congress, created the
March On Washington Movement in 1941. 43
March

on

Washington

Committees

Washington, New York and Chicago.

By May of that year,

had

been

organized

in

This march was in protest

of the discrimination blacks had been encountering in the
working environment.

The march was eventually called off, but

only after President Roosevelt pledged that executive action
would be enacted.

On June 25, 1941, he issued Executive Order

8802, barring discrimination in the defense industries and
also

establishing a

five-member

Fair Employment Practice

Committee. 44 On May 27, 1943, Executive Order 9346 reorganized
the FEPC and expanded its jurisdiction beyond the defense
industries, to include virtually all businesses which in any
way affected the national interest. 45
The

Committee

had

no

enforcement

powers,

it

only

Such agreements are now unlawful.
See, for example,
Charles J. Morris, ed., The Developing Labor 2d ed.,
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1983)
42

43

Jack M. Bloom,
Movement (Bloomington
Press, 1987), 78.

. ,.C=l""a""'s'""s""'..__'""'R....a'""'c"""e=---.-=a=n=d.___,,t=h....,e,___.C=i~·v......=i=l-=R=i._g""'h._.t=s
Indianapolis:
Indiana University

&

"Hill, Black Labor and the American Legal system-, 179.
45

Ibid.
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investigated complaints against employers and unions.

It

literally faced defiance from both unions and employers until
its demise on June,

1946.

Many of the unions ignored the

committee or openly defied it.

The end of the war saw the

FEPC further weakening, with unions opposing the establishment
of a permanent FEPC.

Southerners had enough political clout

to defeat the legislation creating a permanent committee.

In

the long run, the FEPC had very little effect on unions.

It

had no power whatsoever to enforce compliance.

Due to the

fact it had no authority or support from Congress,

it was

never accepted by employers, unions or the public.
In 1942 the National War Labor Board was charged with the
responsibility of settling all labor disputes which involved
a threat to national security. 46

This same year the SWOC

became the United Steelworkers of America.

The black caucus

to the convention sought to elect a black to the international
office,

but

were

unsuccessful.

discrimination of blacks,

with the

The

South

continued

local steelworkers CIO

union doing little to improve racial equality.

The CIO, even

though it had taken a stand on discrimination, did very little
in

overseeing

Discrimination

the

unions

in employment,

enforcement
hiring,

of

the

policy.

wages and promotion

continued.

U. s. National War Labor Board, The Termination Report
of the National War Labor Board (Washington, D. C. :
GPO,
1947), 5.
(hereinafter cited as Termination Report).
46
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The government continued to become involved companies and
unions.

Collective bargaining changed during this time, when

industry-wide bargaining began to take place.

Up until the

beginning of World War II, union and management were the two
parties

involved

in

collective

bargaining,

but

now

government comes into the picture as the third party.

the
This

comes on the heals of the Little Steel Case ..
The Little Steel Case involved Bethlehem Steel, Inland
steel, Republic Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube.
gained

bargaining

rights

in

these

plants

in

The SWOC
1941

and

immediately began conducting separate negotiations with each
of these companies.

Negotiations continued and eventually

went before the War Labor Board on July 16, 1942 where the War
Labor Board heard the cases as one.
was wages.

One of the major issues

When the War Labor Board handed down their wage

formula for the small steel companies, it became known as the
"Little

Steel"

formula,

which

would

set

the

future

wage

pattern for the larger steel companies.
Steel Industry's Industrial Relations System
In examining the steel industry from the late lSOO's up
to

the

mid-1940's,

the

three

factors

identified become more pronounced.

which

Kochan

has

Their interaction in the

environment during certain periods of time begins to present
a clearer picture of the evolution of the steel industry's
industrial relations system.
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The industry, the first factor, went through a number of
transformations.
to

the

demand

Production in the late 1800's increased due
for

steel.

By

the

1920 's

several

steel

companies have consolidated and production capacity continuing
to expand.

Then during the 1930's, during the Depression,

production fell until 1940 when demand again increased with
the start of World War II.

It was in the environment of the

1930's, when people were being laid off and wages were being
cut,

that unionization in steel began to emerge.

In the

1940's the pendulum swayed the other way putting the steel
industry back on top.
Another factor is the worker.
industry

is

positions,

made
in

the

up

of

skilled

production

In the 1800's the steel
workers,

process.

hired
These

into

are

highly

skilled individuals desperately needed by the employers.
mechanization

and

division

of

labor

increased,

production grew and companies became more powerful.
increase

in mechanization meant the need for

worker was not as great as it had been.

key

As

steel
This

the skilled

The introduction of

new machinery, a greater number of semi-skilled and unskilled
workers, all played a major role in reducing the power of the
skilled worker.

This new large pool of unskilled workers are

what unified the workforce and set the stage for an industrial
union.

In addition the Depression and the changes Franklin

D. Roosevelt made under the New Deal, paved the way for the

swoc.
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This momentum in the union movement was a product of the
economical,

social

and

political

Depression.

This was a time of layoffs,

environment

of

the

unemployment and

those who did continue to work could expect a cut in wages.
The black workers, not yet integrated into the workplace or
the unions, were the first to be laid off.

As workers grew

more and more disenchanted, union organizing began to take
place. 47
Due to increasing industrialization there was a shift in
black migration from farms to cities. 48
became the unskilled worker.

The

swoc,

These individuals
with the aid of the

National Negro Congress, brought blacks to the union.
though they were now in the unions,
discrimination.
The

government

Even

they were faced with

Racial discrimination was at every corner.
passed

laws

against

discrimination,

which

unions and businesses were required to follow, and they in

47

For reasons as to why employees JO.ln unions see for
example, P.B. Beaumont, Change in Industrial Relations: The
Organization and Environment, (New York:
Routledge, 1990).
Charles c. Heckscher, The New Unionism: Employee Involvement
in the Changing Corporation (New York:
Basic Books, 1988).
Diane Watson, Managers of Discontent (New York:
Routledge,
1988. Donald M. Wells, Empty Promises:
Quality of Working
Life Programs and the Labor Movement (New York:
Monthly
Review Press, 1987).
0

See, for example, James R. Grossman, Land of Hope:
Chicago. Black Southerners. and the Great Migration (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989); and for a discussion of
the black worker and the problems they faced in employment
and with unions see, Robert B. Grant, The Black Man Comes to
the City: A Documentary Account from the Great Migration to
the Great Depression. 1915-1930 (Chicago:
Nelson Hail Co.,
1972), 82-124.
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turn incorporated these laws into their respective policies.
Despite the evolution of legislation many union constitutions
proceeded to prohibit black membership. 49
The government is the third factor that effected the
steel industry's industrial relations system.

The government

went from a hands-off approach, to passing legislation giving
it power to intervene and act as an arbitrator.
reflect the changing climate.

The laws

The government has now run the

gamut of no involvement to total involvement. 50

This third

"factor" acted according to whatever issues needed to be
addressed at any given time.
Companies responded to the growing need of steel by
increasing their mechanization.

This, in turn, affected the

labor, prompting the National Labor Relations Act.

Kochan's

model allows for the interactions of these three factors at
each level.

The evolution of labor-management relations is

better understood and a sketch of the picture of their future
course has now been painted.
Kochan' s three factors and labor-management relations are
at the core of how race relations policies evolved.
can be developed or implemented in a vacuum.

No policy

It takes people,

9Many union constitutions prohibited black members. See,
for example, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,
323 U.S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226, 89 L. Ed. 173 (1944).
4

See Termination Report, 6 where William H. Davis, Chair
of the National Defense Mediation Board expresses a word of
caution regarding government involvement in labor disputes.
50
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interaction and events to be the impetus for any type of
change.

Kochan's model takes all of this into consideration

and leaves room for growth.
1945 to 1969 were years in which many changes occurred
in

the

area

of

civil

workforce.

At

Inland

management

that

was

rights
Steel

and

the

the

committed

integration of

major
to

equal

factor

was

rights.

the
new
The

individuals they hired, such Mr. Caples, shared their goals
of making

Inland

a

company where

all

employees would be

respected and treated as equals, in every facet of their work.
Unions and their policies of integrating black members
also evolved during this time period.

In most instances, this

was due to the laws which were passed mandating unions and
employers to abolish their discriminatory policies.

As Kochan

has identified, the external environment and the pressures
which ensued were the most critical factors in the development
of the steel industry's industrial relations system and race
relations policies.

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND OF STEEL INDUSTRY PRIOR TO 1945
overview of Steel Industry
Generally, blacks were used as strikebreakers in all
industries,
Employers

and

the

imported

blacks

advantage to employers
find work.

steel

industry

during

becaus~

was

strikes.

no

exception.

This

was

an

blacks primary concern was to

Because they were not effected by public or

unions' opinion regarding unionization, they had no qualms of
acting as replacements.

The jobs blacks held in the South did

not pay as well as working in factories.

When the opportunity

arose for them to make more money they took advantage of the
situation.

Another advantage was that employers could adopt

lower wage scales because it was difficult for blacks to find
employment.

Yet with the passage of the National Industrial

Recovery Act and the new recognition which unions received,
management was forced to view employees in a new light.
two main reasons blacks were affected were:

The

(1) because they

were part of the labor force and (2) because they were part
of the labor force which was more likely to be taken advantage
of by both management and unions.
21

22
Prior to employing blacks, the labor supply was mainly
drawn from Europe.

Blacks had been used in northern steel

plants as strike breakers during the period 1875-1914.

In

the south blacks were always a potential labor force, but were
not used until industry, faced with a strike, was forced to
do so.

The United States experienced an extreme manpower

shortage with the coming of World War I, forcing companies to
use black workers.
During World War I blacks began to enter all northern
industries.

Between 1910 and 1920,

the black population

increased in many of the major cities.

In Detroit, the black

population
percent,

increased
Chicago

percent. 51
newcomers

The

by

148.2

steel

comparable

611.3
percent

industry
to

percent,

the

and

in

Cleveland

307.9

Pittsburgh

47.2

in

Chicago

employed

meat

packing

industry.

black
In

Illinois, the black workforce in the steel industry increased
from 35 in 1916 to 1209 in 1919. 52

In Gary,

Indiana U.S.

Steel's black workforce increased from 407 in 1916 to 1295 by
1918. 53
In the steel strike of 1919, the use of blacks as strike
breakers reached its heights.

It is estimated that 30,000 to

51

Cayton, Black Workers and the New Union, 6.

52

Grossman, Land of Hope, 184.

53

Ibid.
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5
4 0,000 blacks were recruited as strike breakers. '

By 1920 the

census said that 105,641 or 14.4 percent blacks were in the
iron and steel industries."
It is estimated that between the years 1920-1930 over
1,000,000 blacks left their rural southern homes.%

Some moved

to cities in the south, but most migrated to the north.

The

demand for black workers was mainly in the steel plants.

Of

all the steel producing states,

Illinois received the most

migration of blacks. 57
In 1921, the immigration law put a stop to most of the
European labor supply,

forcing northern industries to draw

upon the south for unskilled labor.
the

lowest

industry.

paid
As

and

the

most

length

Blacks were brought into

unpleasant
of

jobs

residency

in

in

the

this

steel

country

increased, there was a tendency for various nationality groups
to rise in the occupational hierarchy and have jobs at the
lower levels filled by the most recent immigrant groups.
example, the earliest immigrants,

For

the English and Germans,

were from Northern Europe and the first to enter industry.

5

'William Foster, The Great Steel Strike And Its Lessons
(New York: B.W. Huebscsh, 1920), 207.
55

Department of Research and Investigations of The
National Urban League, Negro Membership in American Labor
Unions (New York: Alexander Press, 1930; repr., New York:
Negro Universities Press, 1969), 14.

York:

56

Cayton, Black Workers in the New Unions, 6.

57

Emmett J. Scott, Negro Migration During the War,
Oxford University Press, 1920) 58.

(New
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Therefore, they were the first to rise from laborers to highly
skilled

and

sometimes

to

executive

positions.

This

occupational succession was slow for blacks, in addition to
which there were limits to how far the black worker could
People

rise.

rationalized

keeping

blacks

in

the

most

undesirable and unpleasant jobs, such as working in the open
hearth, rolling or "hot"

mills,~

because they believed the

blacks could stand the heat better than the white men. Blacks
faced discrimination at every turn. 59
few

promotions,

unemployment. 60

but

they

Companies

also

Not only were they given
faced

segregated

displacement

blacks

in

and

housing,

t

lunchrooms and at work. 61
Obstacles Steel Industry Faced in Unionizing
The steel industry faced several major obstacles in
attempting to unionize the steel worker:

racial and ethnic

58

The rolling mills, also known as "hot mills", is the
major process involved in steel manufacturing.
The mill is
hot and in this phase of the process a piece of steel weights
from 30 to 3,000 pounds.
The temperature during this time
frequently exceeds 2000
Fahrenheit.
In addition to heat
generated by furnaces, equipment and the steel itself, the
area is smoky and noisy.
Alice Katherine Osborne, An
Encyclopedia of the Iron and steel Industry (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1959), 356.
5

York:

9Robert c. Weaver, Negro Labor: A National Problem (New
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946), 297.

60

Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I. 1917.1.2.2.l (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 13.
61

Grant, The Black Man Comes to the City, 124.
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heterogeneity; wage spread; and company control of workers. 62
The steel industry had a large number of ethnic groups
in their workforce, and when the blacks and Mexicans began to
arrive, this added to the already diverse ethnic work group.
There soon came to be three and sometimes five major racial
and ethnic categories:
•Americans - descendants of the earlies.t immigrants
which were the English, Irish, Scotch, Welsh,
Germans and Scandinavians
•Foreigners or "hunkies" - the later immigrants which
were the Roumanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians,
•Greeks, Italians and others from Eastern and
Southern Europe
•Blacks
•Mexicans, which sometimes were the fifth group. 63
Mexicans entered the steel industry as unskilled laborers
and competed for jobs with blacks in the steel mills of the
Pacific Coast, Colorado and the Calumet District in northern
Indiana.

The mixture of these races in the labor force

divided the workforce as such, that it prevented the formation
of any type of organization.
The differences in wages were another reason there was
no solidarity in the labor force.

There were three levels of

income among the steel workers:
•Highly skilled were those which were involved in
the making and rolling of iron and steel. Some
of these jobs included smelters, puddlers,
shearman, rollers, heaters, which were paid on a
tonnage basis and received the highest wages in
the plants.
•Mechanical tradesmen were those in the standard
62

Cayton, Black Workers and the New Unions, 43.

63

Ibid.

I

44
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crafts, such as brick layers, machinists,
boilermakers, electrical workers. They received
less than the skilled iron and steel workers, but
more than the lowest group.
•Semi-skilled operatives, unskilled laborers and
maintenance men were considered to be the lowest
paid worker. 6 •
Whites

generally

made

up

the

first

category

and

foreigners, blacks and Mexicans were generally the majority
of the

last category.

The skilled

work~rs

were able to

maintain a higher standard of living and tended to identify
themselves with the managerial class because they held the
best jobs.

For this reason, they were reluctant to become

union members.
In 1903, U.S. Steel began a program where employees could
purchase company stock.

Their purpose was to give the worker

a stake in the company.

Unskilled workers were not expected

to buy stock,

which

further

split the

ranks

of workers.

Bethlehem Steel Corporation, International Harvester Company,
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Company were among other companies which also began to
implement such a program.
The growth of unionism was also stifled by the steel
companies' control over their workers.

In many instances the

workers lived on company owned property further strengthening

Uibid.

I

48.
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the employer ties to the employees personal lives. 65 Companies
also instituted such welfare programs as bowling leagues,
visiting

nurses,

accident

prevention

programs.

mutual

aid

programs

societies,
and

stock

ownership,

and

sanitation

health

Pension and group insurance plans also made the

worker more dependent on the company.

Workers with many years

of service were reluctant to join the union for fear of losing
their pension.

There was also the fear that benefits of group

insurance could be lost if employment in their plant were to
cease.
Another barrier to unions was the company union.

The

first large industry to use the Employee's Representative Plan
was the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company which was organized by
John D. Rockefeller,
1913.

Jr.

after the coal miner's strike in

It was during this post-war period company unions

became a way of fighting independent unions.

The War Labor

Board had established more than 200 shop committees in plants
which had been producing items for the war. 66
War Labor Board was dissolved,

As soon as the

employers proceeded to also

dissolve the committees and tried to substitute company unions
for the shop committees.

This was the time when company

unions in the iron and steel industry were introduced.

65

For an in-depth study of the extent companies went in
creating a forced dependency and dominating employees lives
see for example, Walter H. Uphoff, Kohler on Strike: Thirty
Years of Conflict (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
66

Cayton, Black Workers and New Unions, 58.

28
From 1919-1926, these employee representation plans were
introduced to large industries, blacks were included.

Blacks

were familiar with this pattern of a relationship between
employer and employee.

The company unions wanted them, but

the white unions did not.
Unionization of Steel
Union's

attempts

to organize the steel

industry was

significant to the integration of the workforce.

In steel,

the majority of the jobs were the skilled and unskilled jobs
in the mills, which were the main areas of organization.

It

was not unusual that many of'the lower level, or unskilled
jobs,

were

usually held by blacks.

discrimination

faced

discrimination

in

unionization

is

the

in

employment,

unions.

important

In addition
blacks

However,

because

the

the

to

also

faced

history

issues

of

the

of
the

integration of the workforce and the racial policies which
were eventually implemented by companies and unions blended
together.

A checks and balances system was created, whereby

the two entities eventually used each other to enforce one or
the other's

anti-discrimination policies.

Sons of the Vulcan
In order for one to better understand why the steel
industry treatment towards blacks evolved the way it did, one
must look at the industry's history.

Unionism in the steel

industry dates back to 1858, which was when the Sons of Vulcan

29
was

founded

in Pittsburgh by

a

group of

iron puddle rs. 67

Discrimination in the steel industry had its roots here.
the union formed,

When

it had a constitutional provision which

barred blacks from becoming members.

In 1862 the Sons of

Vulcan formed a national organization called National Forge.
on August 3, 1878, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel
and Tin Workers was organized when delegates from the National
Forge, the United Nailers and two smaller iron unions met in
Emerald

Hall

in

amalgamated body.

Pittsburgh

and

declared

themselves

an

Between 1880 and 1890, they succeeded in

unionizing most of the iron mills in the Pittsburgh district.
During

these

early

years

interested in organizing blacks.

the

Amalgamated

was

not

The Sons of Vulcan policies

had been carried over by its members.

The Amalgamated did not

go to the lengths the Sons of Vulcan had gone to by officially
incorporating a clause barring blacks in their constitution,
yet

they

did

steelworkers.

not

officially

organizing

the

black

In 1881, blacks were admitted into the union,

but not into white lodges.

67

favor

Separate lodges were thus created.

Puddling was a process used for making wrought iron.
As pig iron was removed from the blast furnace it still
contained impurities.
Before the iron could be rolled into
finished products these impurities had to be removed and the
iron had to be made soft. This was accomplished in a large
ovenlike structure called a puddling furnace.
During this
step of the iron-making process the iron was boiled, reduced
to molten form and stirred constantly by the operator called
a puddler. Thomas Southcliffe Ashton, Iron and Steel in the
Industrial Revolution (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968),
87-95.
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The

first

black

lodge

was

the

organized in 1887 in Pittsburgh.

Garfield

Lodge

By 1888,

which

was

the Amalgamated

dominated the whole trade union movement and was the most
powerful union in the United States.
The unionization of steel continued to struggle.
after the organization of the U. s.

In 1901

Steel Corporation,

the

Association thought it could organize workers in the non-union
mills of this new corporation.
union and management,

There were meetings between

but the union thinking it was more

powerful, underestimated the operators.

A strike, which was

lost in two weeks, culminated with the union being forced to
accept an agreement.
it covered

This proved to be undesirable because

fewer mills

settlements.

than

any of

the

earlier proposed

The loss of this strike further weakened the

union and after 1902, the union was forced out of the mills
in the East.
exist.

By 1909, steel unionism essentially ceased to

Attempts to organize steel again gained momentum

during World War I.

In 1918 at the American Federation of

Labor convention plans were developed to begin a campaign to
organize the industry, but efforts were not successful.
The

membership

of

the

Amalgamated

composed largely of the skilled worker.

Association

was

The union became

interested in the unskilled black worker only when forced to
do

so.

The

skilled

white

workers

in

the

North

feared

competition from the skilled black workers which migrated from
the South.

Even though there were segregated locals the white
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worker refused to work, or acknowledge the black worker.

As

union membership began to decline, the numbers of blacks in
the

steel

industry

began to

increase.

By

the

time

the

Association realized they needed the black worker to survive,
it was too late.
Knights of Labor
In 1880 the Knights of Labor, an industr.ial organization,
made

attempts

to

organize

all

workers,

unskilled, regardless of race.

both

skilled

and

They were the first to make

efforts to organize blacks on a large scale.

In 1886, when

it was at its most powerful the Knights claimed they had
60, 000 black members. 68

Their goals were twofold:

to unite

all workers regardless of race, creed, color, sex or national
origin and to abolish what they termed "wage slavery. 1169
Knights

did

not

openly

wage

a

campaign

to

end

The

racism.

Segregated locals continued and inequalities remained, but the
Knights were the first to develop the principles of labor
solidarity and racial equality.
The Knights, spreading themselves too thin, began loosing
power

by

trying

to

deal

with

too

many

issues

at

once.

Attempting to establish an eight hour work day, increase wages
and involvement in too many strikes, proved to be too much.

68
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These factors, along with few full-time paid official without
any real managerial experience was their downfall.

By 1893

they began loosing membership and anti-black members became
the majority.

The Amalgamated began to pick up where they

left off and little by little black representation in the
union continued to increase. 70
The Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union
During the latter part of the 1920's and early 30's the
communist party had several industrial unions whose goal was
to organize the masses of the unorganized worker, including
all minorities.
was

one

of

The Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union

these

unions.

This

Amalgamated Association in that

union differed

from

the

it tried to organize the

unemployed and draw them into the picket lines in case of
strikes.

Another difference was that their dues and fees were

on a sliding scale, therefore individual's paid according to
their earnings.
The S.M.W.I.U. regarded organizing blacks as one of their
major tasks.

The membership book of the union stated it:

... fights for full equality for the Negro workers both on and off the job.
At all times the
S.M.W.I.U. strives for the greatest possible unity

70

Labor agreements during this time provided for "white
jobs" and "colored jobs."
See, for example, Lamont E.
Stallworth, "The Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances:
An Examination Into the Treatment of Sex and Race-Based
Discrimination Grievances by Arbitrators Since World War II,"
(Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1980), 173-195.
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in the struggles of all of the workers. 11
The S.M.W.I.U. placed this emphasis on the black worker
because according to the Communists, blacks were fighting to
be liberated from the "capitalist-imperialist social structure
in the United States" and would therefore make the best allies
and "best fighters for the revolution."

After the passage of

the NRA the S.M.W.I.U. grew and did enjoy
it was not to last.

~ome

Their downfall was the "red scare" which

began taking place. 12

Employers and the government began

directing campaigns against the S.M.W.I.U.
declining

when

success, but

announcements

were

Communist unions were "un-American."

Membership began

made

that

the

"red,"

Employers also refused

to deal with the union on the grounds it considered itself a
Communist organization.

The s.M.W.I.U. was finally defeated.

It disbanded with many of its members joining the Amalgamated.
The NIRA and the Steel Code
When the NIRA was passed in 1933 its purpose was to
restore

jobs to the unemployed and to increase the total

national purchasing power.

One of the provisions was to have

Bert Cochran, Labor and Communism: The Conflict that
Shaped American Unions (Princeton:
Princeton University
Press, 1977), 156.
71

72
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each industry write a code which would then be presented to
the

National

Recovery

Administration

for

approval.

The

Administration's goal was that these codes were to be written
by management, labor and the consumers.
to be the case.

However, this was not

What came to pass, was that the drafting of

the codes soon came to rest with the employers.
The steel Code was approved on August 19,
included wage

differentials

Frances Perkins,

between

the Secretary of

the

North

1933,
and

and

South.

Labor at that time was

firmly opposed to these differentials. 73

At the steel Code

hearings before the National Recovery Administration on July
31, 1933, Secretary Perkins is quoted as saying:
The proposal to divide the country into 21 separate
wage districts with differentials of 2 and 3 cents
an hour needs to be very carefully examined. It has
the appearance of an arbitrary fixing of wages that
can hardly be justified by differences in costs of
living.
If separate wage zones are needed they
should be established only after the most careful
research; and the number of such zones should be
strictly limited to a very few that are dictated by
essential and substantial differences, and not by
the mere fact that some employers may have been in
a position to press the common labor rate down a
few cents lower than others. If this is not done,
one of the worst forms of unfair competition may be
perpetuated, namely, that which is brought about by
those who cut labor rates.
An Industry that has
been given the privilege of preventing unfair price
competition must assume the responsibility also of

73
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preventing unfair wage competition.n
The Administration had compromised on other parts of the
code.

Thus, despite opposition, the Administration proceeded

to accept the code and "overlook" the wage differential.
The steel differentials varied in districts, but the Northsouth differential was even greater.

The lowest wage in the

south was twenty-five cents an hour, whereas in the North it
was thirty-five cents; the highest wage in the North was forty
cents an hour and in the South it was twenty-seven cents. 75
This North-South differential was directed towards blacks, but
pressure

from

manufacturers

the

steel

further

industry

intensified

and
the

organized

southern

situation,

and

the

Administration felt it was forced to make the concession of
letting this wage differential stand.
Codes

from

other

industries

also

included

this

wage

differential, such as the Cotton Textile Code, Petroleum Code.
The Codes themselves did not create the wage differential.
This

wage

differential

existed

because

of

the

unequal

bargaining power of labor in various parts of the country and
among the different racial groups.

Yet the codes did extend

to the situation a formal recognition and the sanction of the
federal government.

1

'Cayton, Black Workers and the New Unions, 97. As quoted
in the Transcript of the Corrections on the Analysis of the
Steel Code by the Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, before
the National Recovery Administration, July 31, 1933, p. 18.
75
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In doing this the government opened the door to problems
which still exist today, mainly because many of the written
codes were done so arbitrarily and with the sole purpose of
distinguishing the white and black labor force of an industry.
An NRA official who was as equally concerned about the wage
differential as Secretary of Labor Perkins was of the opinion
that

these

differentials

would

eventually

competitions between black and white workers.

lead

to

job

He too, agreed

this would perpetuate the problem of exploiting labor, but
more specifically it would have a greater negative impact on
blacks. 76
Other NRA staff members at the time felt the Recovery
Administration

itself

was

also

prejudice

to

some

extent.

Despite negative reactions, the problems confronted by black
workers were usually ignored by the NRA.

Mr. John P. Davis,

of the Joint Committee on Recovery wrote that officials of the
NRA essentially were not serious about integrating the blacks
into the workforce."
the

first

was

He also made several important points:

that

blacks

had

less

than

representatives in six hundred code hearings;
the

National

Industry

Recovery

a

dozen

in addition,

Administration

employed

approximately 1, 000 people, with no black indi victual above the

Hibid., 100-101.
"John P. Davis, "Blue Eagles and Black Workers," The New
Republic, (November 14, 1934), 7.
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rank of a messenger. 78
The Division of Research and Planning employed Mabel Byrd
to study the problems of black labor under the NRA.

She was

denied an off ice for four weeks at the NRA headquarters.

When

a spot was finally found for her, she was placed in a corner
in which black census workers had been Jim-Crowed. 79

After

several months

being

she was notified that the study was

cancelled because it would be "preposterous" to have such a
study done by a black.

Ms. Byrd was convinced that the reason

the study was cancelled was due to the fact that it would have
unearthed discrimination against the black under the NRA.
On May 31, 1934, the President signed an amended code for
the steel industry.

This amended version had virtually no

changes on the most

important point -- the Southern wage

differential remained in force.

In 1936 there were 85,000

black steel workers, yet still in the lowest paying

jobs.~

Their salaries still based on this North-South differential,

78

Ibid

o

79
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averaged between $16 and $22 per week. 11
Revival of Company Unions
When the first Steel Code was adopted there were three
unions

seeking

to

attract

the

steelworkers:

(1)

the

( 2)

the

Amalgamated Association of Iron and Tin Workers;

(Communist) Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union; and (3)
company unions.
Once the NIRA was passed, companies began to aggressively
revive the company unions.

In November, 1933, 45 percent of

the workers (1,164,294 employees) in 3,314 steel plants, were
under Employees Representation Plans. 12 This was a 218 percent
increase of membership as compared with an increase

~f

percent in the membership of organized labor unions. 83
estimated that by December of 19 3 3 ,
3,000,000

employees

in

company

125

It is

there were more than

unions. 84

industries with strong company unions were:

Some

of

the

automobile, iron

and steel, foundries, machine shops, electrical manufacturing,
metal mining, petroleum refining, rubber products and farm
machinery.
The Employee Representation Plans were established to

11

Ibid.

12

Cayton, Black Workers in the New Unions, 104.

83

Ibid.

14

Ibid.
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meet

all

of

the

qualifications

of

collective

bargaining.

Representatives were elected and committees established to
meet once a month,
committee.

with management representation on each

The plan, which could be amended, also provided

for a grievance procedure.

In many cases before a grievance

could be submitted to an outside arbitrator or an amendment
made, a majority vote of the committee had to be obtained.
Because employee representation on the committees was 50%,
this meant that a management representative would have to vote
with the workers in order for there to be a majority vote.
Employees supported these company unions, because they
'

feared for their jobs.
of the plans.

Others did not understand the meaning

Once the SWOC came to power the ERP were the

first items they attacked.

Charges were filed with the NLRB

against some of the larger corporations against this companyunion

system.

Eventually,

the

NLRB declared them to be

illegal, forcing companies to dissolve them.
The CIO and

swoc

At the 1934 AFL Convention, two resolutions were passed:
(1) to conduct an organization campaign in the iron and steel
industry and (2) that this industrial form of organization be
applied

to

all

basic

industries.

The

Executive

Council

continued to protect the rights of the existing craft unions
and did not wholeheartedly support the idea.
movement thus proved to be unsuccessful.

The organizing
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Led by John L. Lewis, more pressure was exerted from the
industrial block to have industrial unionism,

at the 1935

Again, they were defeated by the craft group.

convention.

The day after the convention the industrial bloc planned a
conference

for

committee for

November

9,

whereby

Industrial Organization

composed of the following unions:
Amalgamated

the

Typographical
Workers,

Clothing

Union,

the

the Oil Field,

they
(CIO).

the

The CIO was

the United Mine Workers,

Workers,

the

International

Gas,

organized

International

Ladies'

Garment

Well & Refinery Workers,

the

United Hatters, Cap, Millinery Workers and the International
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.
In 1935 Lewis resigned as Vice-President of the AFL, and
the CIO began their preparation to organize the workers in the
iron and steel industry.

To accomplish this goal, they formed

the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC).

In February,

1936, Lewis offered the AFL $500,000 toward a fund of one and
a

half million,

to organize the steel

industrial line, and not a craft line. 85
proposal.

industry,

along an

The AFL declined the

The same proposal was made to the Amalgamated

Association, and they accepted.

The Steel Workers Organizing

Committee was now organized to do the

job Lewis had been

wanting.
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The swoc grew and by the end of 1937 was bargaining for
550,000 steelworkers and had contracts with approximately 450
That same year swoc was

steel companies. 86

organizing the U.S. Steel Corporation.

Myron

successful

c.

in

Taylor, Chair

of the U.S. Steel Corporation and Lewis reached an agreement
without

a

bargaining

strike,
agent

making

for

"Big

the

CIO

Steel"

union

the

exclusive

workers,

yet

it

different story with the "little steel companies".

was

a

This was

a group of the smaller independent companies which consisted
of:

Bethlehem, Republic, Youngstown Sheet and Tube and Inland

steel, which banded together to resist the union.

The Little

Steel Companies refused to sign a contract and on May 26, 1937
a strike order, covering 75,500 workers in the plants of the
independent companies in Chicago, Indiana Harbor, Youngstown,
Canton, Massilon, Warren, Niles and Cleveland was issued.

The

most violent strike ended at Republic Steel's South Chicago
Mill, with the Chicago Memorial Day Massacre where ten people
were killed. 87

For the time being,

the SWOC was defeated.

After the strike, Republic, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, and
Bethlehem
LaFollette

continued
Committee

fighting
did

an

against
expose

the
on

union.
the

The

companies'

involvement during this time period and the extent they had

86

87
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gone to in trying to crush the union. 88

After the report was

made public Republic ended up paying $350, 000 in personal
damage suits to 208 union members who had been injured."
addition,
ordered

on August,
Bethlehem

1939,
Steel

In

the new Labor Relations Board
to

dissolve

its

Employee

Representation Plan and to stop interfering with the

swoc.

similar findings were also the case with Yoqngstown Sheet and
Tube and Republic, where strikers were reinstated with back
pay.
The

SWOC

held

their

first

convention

in

1937

and

identified eight objectives of their union:
1.

To unite in one organization, regardless of
creed, color or nationality, all workmen and
working women eligible for membership, employed
in and around iron and steel manufacturing,
processing, and fabricating mills and factories
of the American continent.

2.

To
increase the wages and improve the
conditions of employment of membership by
legislation, conciliation, joint agreement or
other legitimate means.

3.

To endeavor to obtain by joint negotiations or
legislative enactment a six-hour day and fiveday week.

4.

To strive for a minimum wage scale for all
members of the organization.

88

James J. Matles and James Higgins, Them and Us:
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5.

To provide for the education of the children
by lawfully prohibiting their employment until
they have at least reached 18 years of age.

6.

To secure equitable statutory old age pension,
workmen's
compensation
and
unemployment
insurance law.

7.

To enforce existing just laws and to secure the
repeal of those which are unjust.

8.

To secure by legislative enactment, laws
protecting the limbs, lives and health of our
membership; establish our right to organize;
prohibiting use of
deception to
secure
strikebreakers; preventing the employment of
privately armed guards during labor disputes;
and such other legislation as will be
beneficial. 90

The SWOC knew if it were to be successful , then the
black worker would have to be organized and it proceeded to
do just that because officers of the SWOC were connected in
some way to the United Mine Workers Union, which had more
black members than any other labor group.

Also by 1937, more

black people were educated in union campaigns in addition to
which at this time the CIO also endorsed by the National Bar
Association of Black lawyers and

judges and the National

Negro Congress.
In 1942,
of

swoc

America

changed their name to the United Steelworkers

and

they

proceeded

organizing the black steelworkers.

with

their

just importantly to

stress the union's nondiscriminatory policy.

Ibid.

I

43.

of

They felt one way to do

this was to get black organizers and

90

campaign

By the early

44
1940's SWOC claimed a black membership of 35,000 and by 1943,
70 I 000

91

The

SWOC

did

benefit

the

black

steelworker.

It

increased their wages, decreased work hours and put an end to
some of the Jim Crow practices in some parts of the steel
industry.

Yet,

the

"equal and fair treatment" which was

needed for solidarity was lacking.
both

Wage

~iff erentials

further

entrenched

and

occupational

discrimination

job

segregation.

World War II opened up more jobs for blacks,

but there were still many sections of the mills which were
closed

to

them,

including

skilled

positions.

This

segregation also resulted in blacks receiving less seniority 9 '
and being the first ones to be laid off.
Formation of The United Steelworkers of Ainerica
At the 1942 convention the s.w.o.c. officially changed
its name to the United Steelworkers of America (USWA).
issues

concerning race

unaddressed.

The USWA,

in

employment continued to

The

remain

as other unions before them,

also

incorporated nondiscriminatory verbiage in their constitution.
At this convention they passed a resolution:
to fight to secure the equality of treatment for all
nclark, Forging A Union Of Steel, 58.
"See for example, EEOC v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n., 511 F.2d 273, 10 FEP 545 (5th Cir. 1975); U.S. v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F. 2d 418, 457-58, 3 FEP 862,
Reh. denied en bane, 451 F.2d 461, 4 FEP 2 (5th Cir• 1971),
cert. denied sub nom.; Locomotive Engineers v. U.S. 406 U.S.
906, 4 FEP 661 (1971).
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workers, Negro and white, and all races and creeds
in industrial employment and promotion, in
vocational training,
in union leadership and
service, in government and armed forces. 93
Race relations policies not only with the USWA, but also
with

many

steel

companies,

continued

to

be

symbolic.

Mechanisms were now in place to begin correcting the gross
injustices confronted by blacks.

As legislation evolved and

corporations' and the USWA's commitment to equal opportunity
continued to grow, the integration of blacks in the workplace
gradually emerged.

It would take many more years before any

real progress could be discerned.

93
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CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND OF INLAND STEEL PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
Prior to

signing a

contract with what was

Steelworkers Organizing Committee,
industry experiences.

then

the

Inland Steel had typical

In the early 1900's the environment was

not conducive to any type of union drives.

Just as the steel

industry resisted unionization - so did Inland.

During union

drives, the steel industry faced severe criticism by the AFL.
One

was

that

the

U.S.

Steel

Corporation

was

becoming

a

monopoly and much too powerful, and the other was that the
labor conditions in the mills were deplorable.
In 1911 the Charity Organization Society of New York
Launched its Pittsburgh Survey regarding working conditions
at Bethlehem Steel.

This spark touched off a strike with

Bethlehem and was what the A.F. of L representatives needed
to lead a striker's committee to Washington.

Once there they

demanded an investigation be made and a response be issued to
the Survey.

The steel industry was soon receiving scathing

criticism, adding fuel to the fire.

This same year,

John

Fitch published an article in the American Magazine entitled
"Old Age at Forty," which became a battle cry for reform.
46

47

The steel companies worked to counteract this adverse
publicity and the first
accident rate.

area they addressed was the high

The Illinois Steel Company coined the slogan

"safety first," which soon came to be the steel industry's
motto.

Inland, like many others, responded by establishing

a safety department, and by 1915 had reduced its accident rate
by

percent. 94

55

A program

was

employees on the issue of safety.
in

the

workforce,

many

of

started

to

educate

its

Safety concerned all people

which

were

immigrants.

To

accommodate those employees of different nationalities, it is
interesting to note that safety signs in 1911 were printed in
English, Croatian, Polish, Rumanian, Hungarian and Slavic. 95
Companies began to concern themselves with their workers
well-being, both in and outside the work environment.

In 1914

Inland organized the "Inland Fellowship Club" whereby more
than

2, 000

donated

ten

( 70

percent)

cents

each

of

the

month

Indiana Harbor

towards

a

relief

employees
fund

for

families and unemployed Inland employees. 96 Inland donated all
coal necessary for the relief of the employees, in addition
to which, they employed a visiting nurse to provide and care
for the employees' families.

94
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this type of welfare work which steel companies to help quiet
public criticism.

Labor eventually stabilized and the roar

of unionization subsided.

Thus,

going into World War I,

working conditions had improved and the threat of organized
labor was minimal.
world War I
But, World War I altered the environment.
other steel

companies during

the

supplied steel to foreign nations.

early days

Inland, as
of

the war,

When the United States

entered the war, this changed and all of the steel industry
entered into full scale production in the war effort.

Along

with this full scale production came a labor shortage.

As

recalled by Frank Cassel:
The Mexican worker who came to Inland Steel came
essentially with World War I and by and large they
were imports from the American side of the Mexican
border. That was the first batch that came. They
were Mexicans who had been working in the fields in
Southern Texas and they were imported to Inland. 97
In response to a question as to why Mexicans were recruited,
Cassel further stated:
Inland Recruited them for the war - as replacements.
That's how the women got started in the mills.
Women and Mexicans and to a substantial extent
blacks, got started in the mills as a result of the
labor shortage of white Anglos in World War I. It
changed the complexion of the mills. 98

97
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98
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As the demand for labor increased the demands from the
workers also increased.
employee unrest.

War triggered inflation and impacted

As prices were driven up, the steel industry

found that one way of dealing with the situation was to
increase wages.

The average hourly wage at Inland doubled

between 1915-1918.

Total Inland payroll, which was $4, 318, 977

in 1915, more than tripled, reaching $14,55.9,291 in 1918. 99
Post World War I and Renewal of Unionization Efforts
These wage increases were deceptive because as wages
increased so did housing and food.

Between 1915 and 1918

housing

food

increased

ten

eighty-two percent. 100
labor.

perceht

and

prices

escalated

All of these factors revived organized

When the war ended the doors to organize steel were

opened,

yet

employers

still

fought

back.

Employee

representation plans were used by employers as one way of
thwarting

unionism.

After

the

war,

Inland

adopted

shop

committees whereby employees were elected to be on workers
committees and councils.
grievances,

and

in

These committees dealt with managing

some

cases

also

questions about hours and wages.
representation

plan

as

a

dealt

with

general

Inland saw this employee

way

of

providing

"effective

communication and means of contact .•• and to insure justice,

"Inland Steel, The Story
Inland Steel Company, 1971), 9.
100

of

Inland

Steel

(Chicago:

U. s. Census Bureau I statistical Abstract of the United
States. 1925, 322.
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maintain tranquility and promote the general welfare.
In

addition

to

wage

increases

and

the

11101

employee

representation plans, companies began other welfare efforts.
Inland,

along

with

Carnegie,

Bethlehem

and

Youngstown,

announced expanded home building programs and in 1920 began
building the Sunnyside Subdivision for its employees . 102

It

also implemented a saving and profit sharing pension fund.
Other companies formed cooperative clubs to counter the high
cost of living and others bought food to sell at wholesale
prices to their employees.

This welfare capitalism had a

soothing influence on the steel industry.
Yet even though the environment was now relatively calm,
the problem of finding unskilled labor evolved.

The southern

black worker had been a chief source of labor to the steel
industry, but it was something that did not entirely please
some of the steel men.

The president of Inland thought "it

would be better for the industry and the country at large if
the

mills

(Europe] .

could

continue

to

recruit

their

forces

from

The negroes should remain in the south. 11103

With unskilled workers

in demand,

the steel

industry

looked elsewhere and that elsewhere was the Mexican worker.
Mexicans were recruited through employment agencies in San

101

Brody, Steelworkers of America, 227.

102

Inland Steel Public Relations Department, "Inland Steel
History", 58.
103

Ibid. , 266.
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Antonio,

Texas

and

sent north

via

The

trains.

cost

of

transportation, food and the lodging in company houses were
to be repaid out of future wages.

Importing Mexicans in this

manner became very widespread in the steel industry.

This is

not to say that blacks were totally excluded, but the minority
group

representation

census,

the

industry,

percentage

did

not

According

did change.
of

increase

worki~g

blacks
between

to
in

1920-1930.

the
the
Yet

1930
steel
1930

statistics show that in 1924 three of the major steel mills
Mexicans made up 12.1 percent of the labor force and blacks
14.3 percent, and in 1928 the situation was reversed, with
14. 2

percent

Mexicans

and

11.1

percent

blacks . 104

Thus,

between the two minority groups the steel industry now had an
adequate unskilled labor supply.
Inland's Management Style
In the

1930's the government's

posture toward

labor

changed.

The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act

of

and

1933

the

National

Labor

Relations

reinforced the rights of unions to organize.

Act

of

1935

The environment

at Inland Steel during this time was very hostile and ripe for
a union. 105

The employees considered the management style to

be a very dictatorial one.

Workers even thought management

Paul s. Taylor, Mexican Labor In the u. S. : Chicago And
The Calumet Region (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1932), 36.
104
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5whyte, Pattern for Industrial Peace, 1-18.
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went out of its way to recruit people with no experience so
that this way, they would not be familiar with any type of
management style.

A black worker at Inland described the

company's hiring policy of the late 1930's in the following
manner:
If you was colored, you had to be straight from the
South or they wouldn't hire you. You couldn't go
in looking for work dressed up half way decent, like
I am now. You had to go in with an old cap on the
back of your head and a torn shirt and pants and
carrying a paper bag under your arm. First thing
the boss asked was, "How long you been in the city?"
You answer, "I just got in," and he tells you you're
hired. You tell him, "I been here all my life," and
he won't have anything to do with you. 11106
It was also management's belief that discipline and
productivity could best be maintained through the employees
fear of losing their jobs.

Ed Snyder, a foreman during this

time recalled one incident:
Joe Smith would just as soon fire you as look at
you.
Art Thomas (Foreman) was so scared of Joe
Smith that if he saw him coming he would dive right
under those high bake ovens.
The foreman had no
security in all those days.
Joe Smith fired one of our best workers on the line
one day, and there wasn't anybody else who could do
that job. He fired him just because he saw the man
wearing a white shirt. The smiths had an idea that
nobody that wore a white shirt could really work. 107
The management at Inland had no regard for the employees.
The company also had separate wage scales for men, women,
blacks and whites.

In the early 1930's the starting wage for

Whyte, Pattern For Industrial Peace, 7.

106

107

Ibid. , 8.
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black women was

14~

cents an hour, for black men it was

cents and white men 18 ~ cents . 108

16~

During this time period

there were 246 different pay rates for 600 employees • 109
formal

There

were no

job classifications and no

wage structure

system.

It was in this time period the National Industrial

Recovery Act established a forty hour work week, yet there
were no provisions as to when these hours should be worked.
A foreman at Inland describes the length of some of his days:
Many a time I finished my 40 hours on Monday and
Tuesday.
Yes, I worked 20 hours a day on those
days. When you came in in the morning, you'd meet
yourself going home at night. 110
unionization Efforts Gain Momentum
The

unionization

Employees'

effort

at

Inland

began

to

grow.

salaries and the treatment they experienced in

their jobs looked to the union as the primary source to bring
about change.

Pete Calecci, a retired Inland Steel employee

describes his career with the company:
I'm Italian.
Came to the U.S. 1930, when I was
17. Started working at Inland in 1936. Retired in
1978.
For a period of time I maintained my service at the
plant while I was working for the union. When the
union position became permanent I was severed from
Inland 1967. In 67 went with the union and retired

108

Ibid.

109
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110
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in 78. 111
calecci,

one

of

the

indi victuals

who

supported

the

union

campaign, describes the type of people who were active in
organizing the union at Inland:
There were some of the old timers that built the
union, that did suffer by discrimination, not being
promoted because they did not brown nose with the
foreman, but those people had a family.
And they
were afraid.
It was the young punks like me who
had nothing to lose. So it was people like me that
really fought to establish the union. 112
calecci continues describing his position at Inland and his
involvement with the swoc and later the Steelworkers Union:
Of course I was one of the early members of the
steelworkers Organizing Committee. Then I began to
be a representative of the department because we had
to have some representation in the different
departments throughout the plant.
So that if a
worker had a problem they had some person to go to
that represented the Union.
I started working for the company, believe it or not
as a gandy dancer. A track laborer. I had worked
during the Depression on the railroad sometimes just
during the winters. So when I got a job at Inland,
I began to - oh, they put me in the transportation
department which included track laborers. I was one
of the few non-Hispanic speaking persons. Most of
the people, I would say 95 percent or 98 percent of
the workers, were Hispanic speaking people. Mexican
mainly.
And then from there it took me two years to be able
to get transferred to one of the rolling mills and
I suspected I was what we commonly call "black
balled".
One of the reasons was that I had been
active in the Union.
In fact I went further than
that.
Working as a track laborer I worked on a
special shift. They had a gang that was established
111

Pete Calecci,
Chicago, IN.
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2,

1989,
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for the purpose of maintaining certain lead flux
into specific departments.
In the middle shifts,
we used to work from 10 in the morning until 6 in
the evening. Which normally would be an 8-4 (8:00
A.M. to 4:00 P.M.] system.
But we worked 10 to 6
(10:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M.] so that we would be
available in some of the extra hours to keep certain
things in working order.
So this particular department that I was transferred
into
the
forty
inch
mill
from
the
transportation department. So this is how I wound
up in the rolling mills.
I stayed there until I
progressed through the union. Became President for
two consecutive terms.
I held a lot of different
positions. Was on the grievance committee until I
left to become President of the local union and
following that I resigned my last term as President
in order to get on the staff of the international
union-- the regular staff of the Steelworkers Union.
When I retired I was -- I had a position of SubDistrict Director.
And I have been retired now
since 1978 . 113
In 1937 the Little Steel companies, of which Inland was
one, were still fighting against recognizing the union.

One

of the most violent strikes took place at Republic Steel's
South Chicago mill.

It became known as the Memorial Day

Massacre . 114

occurred

Strikes

at

other

steel

companies.

Calecci recalls his involvement:
Ah, yes.
Inland used to pay on the tenth and
twenty-fifth of each month.
That day was May 25.
We got our checks during lunch hour and I had my
check with me and the general foreman of the track
laborers was talking to each guy individually. And
I kind of suspected what he was talking about,
because everybody suspected us to strike to seek
recognition. That is all we were going to seek, was
recognition as a bargaining agent - On Memorial Day.
113
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Chicago, IN.
114
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August

Jeremy Brecher, Strike! (San Francisco:
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2,

1989,

East
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And this was the 25th. So uh, when they got to me,
the proposition was that we would like to use the
workers during the strike.
In other words, you
would be inside the plant and not go in and out
during the strike.
And rather than get involved
and into an argument with them I said "I got my
check today, I got some bills to pay.
I live in
Chicago Heights. Why don't I leave here early. If
I can make it I'll be back.
Meanwhile, this will
give me a chance to pay some of my bills." So, I
got home real early.
My mother and father were
saying "What are you doing home early?"
And I
jokingly said to my father, "Well, I'm going to work
during the strike."
He says "What!"
I had no
intentions of really going back anyway.
So anyway I did not go back.
Those that did stay
now if you can visualize what $4 [$400] and $500
meant to a worker in those days.
[The individuals
which worked during the strike] Earned as much as
$4 [$400] or $500 during the period of time that
they were going to strike inside the plant. Because
they were at the company's disposal and they were
not just getting paid for eight hours, they were
getting paid for additional hours. They knew about
this [my not working during the strike] and figured
"uh oh, I'm blackballed" because generally that's
what they did to those that supported the union.
But I didn't care, I wasn't going to go back to
work.
U.S. Steel finally did agree to allow the s.w.o.c.
to be the bargaining agent of the worker, and signed
a contract with the United Steelworkers Committee
in 1937 and we didn't get a contract from Inland
until almost 1942 - almost five years.
If you can imagine, the first contract that Inland
signed with the Steelworkers was a three page
document - triple spaced. And now ... 115
Inland made no attempt to continue production,

hence

there were few confrontations between the company and workers.
The strike lasted thirty-four days and ended with an agreement

115
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signed by the governor of Indiana and the swoc,
directly between the company and the union.

and not

In a letter to

Governor Townsend of Indiana,

the

company agreed to the

following:

the

SWOC as

(1)

to

recognize

the exclusive

bargaining agent; (2) to reinstate those who had taken part
in the strike;

( 3) to model their wages, hours, grievance

procedure and overtime rates, after those in the U.S. Steel
Agreement. 116
The company refused to sign a
proceeded to take a hard-line approach.

written contract and
The issue went before

the National Labor Relations Board which ruled for the SWOC. 117
'
The Board ordered that if bargaining resulted in agreement,
it should be put in the form of a signed contract.

Inland

appealed and this continued for several more years before the
issue was resolved in favor of the union.
New Management in Charge
In 1939 Inland came under new management, but it would
take some time before any type .of progress to occur.

The

years before World War II were years filled with management's

116
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Basic Industry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 144.
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331 (1938), Inland Steel Company v. National Labor Relations
Board, 5 LRRM 821 (7th Cir. 1940).

58
attempts to turn the situation around and create a more stable
condition. 111
extremely high.

Between

1939-1944

management

turnover

was

The Chicago plant had six managers during

this time period, with foremen turning over even more, and in
one two year stretch, the plant had ten personnel managers. 119
The times were chaotic and they left their mark on both
management and employees.

But eventually an .understanding and

working relationship developed between all concerned.
Inland steel and Application of Kochan's Model
In analyzing Inland's situation during this time period
one can see it was responding'to the environment.

During the

times of depression and times of war it reacted by increasing
or decreasing its labor force and production.

The initial

integration of the company's workforce was the result of the
labor shortages which were experienced during World War I.
In the past, European immigrants had filled the unskilled
positions.

Initially, they had been paid the lowest wages and

worked the most undesirable jobs.

Over the years,

these

individuals assimilated into society and eventually moved up
the employment ladder.

The issue of race relation policies

and the integration of the workforce became more consequential
in the late 1800 's.

Providing equal job and promotional

opportunities for minorities remains a major concern.

11
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Inland also went through periods of welfare capitalism,
again adjusting

to

the

environment.

This would

also

be

considered a smart business strategy because the purpose of
welfare

capitalism120

was

to

keep

individuals

working

developing programs and improving work conditions,
making it more difficult for unionization.
working

to

continue

production

and

thereby

Keeping people

increase

universal and remain constant over time.

by

profits

are

During these bouts,

important issues such as safety and the length of work hours
were addressed, yet in looking back one can see these changes
would not have been made unless the company was forced to.
carrying

this

through Kochan' s

model

of

building an

industrial relations system, the external environment is then
influenced by history, current structures, values and business
strategies.
evolves.

In

a

corporation

this

is

where

its

culture

Organizations can be categorized into four cultures:

(1) power culture - which is where the organization is lead
by a powerful leader who influences all decision making;
role

culture

is

the

characteristic

of

a

organization which assigns tasks to specialists;

(2)

conservative
(3) person

culture - type of organization which exists for the benefit
of its members, e.g. academic institutions.; (4) task culture
- which brings the right people and resources together to get

120

John
A.
Fossum,
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Devel"opment,
Busniess Publications,
structure. Process 3d ed., (Plano:
1985), 32
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It uses the team approach whereby everyone

things done .
contri. b u t es. 121

Organizations can operate in more than one

culture, but there will always be one which is dominant.
Inland went through periods where it placed no value on
employees.
a

The company's management was described as being

"dictatorship"

and

"probably

one

of

the

most

ruthless

managements ever to perform upon the American scene. 11122
are characteristics of a power culture.
transpired

at

Inland

are

not

unique,

These

The events which
but

had

they

been

different, the evolution of the industrial relations system
might not have evolved amidst such conflict.
If an industrial relations system is to be successful,
then

the

organization

needs

to

not

only

adjust

to

its

environment, but if necessary, begin to change its internal
structure and values, in order to bring about change.

History

is there so that we can learn from it, find out what went
right,

or wrong,

so that alternatives can be

identified.

Deficiencies need to be addressed, and in some instances it
will take new management to facilitate these changes.

Many

of Inland's problems were due to its old management style, but
this would change with the new administration. 123
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For more information regarding corporate culture see
for example, Daniel R. Denison, Corporate Culture and
Organizational Effectiveness (New York: Wiley, 1990).

CHAPTER 4
POSTWAR STEEL INDUSTRY
Government Intervention 1945-1969
By 1945 the war Labor Board was created, the Little Steel
Formula implemented and Executive Order 8802 established the
Federal Employment Policy Commission

(FEPC). ~•

1

Steel prices

held almost constant during World
War II, were frozen and new
<
wages decontrolled after World War II.

Wage disputes between

the United Steelworkers Union and steel industry began again
and subsequently wage negotiations followed every year.

Along

with these wage negotiations, the industry experienced strikes
every

year

between

1946-1952.

On

March

31,

1945,

in

anticipation of future deadlocks, the War Labor Board also
established

the

Steel

The

Commission.

Commission was

empowered to resolve disputes.
Post World War II also brought industry-wide bargaining.
Initially, U.S. steel was doing its own bargaining, but it was
soon joined by other steel companies.
established in the steel industry.

iu3 C.F.R. 957 (1941).
61

The USWA became firmly

The union's demand of the

62
elimination of geographic wage differentials which first began
to appear in the 1930s contract negotiations would be an issue
in every contract negotiation until 1956 . 125

It was not until

1953 that some companies with geographic wage differentials
would finally agree to decrease or eliminate them.m
The War

Labor Board,

offset their controlling wage

increases by permitting the expansion of employee benefits.
The master contract, opened in 1947, included benefit items
for the first time.

A review of contracts for the years 1947

through 1959 are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

general wage increases
reduction in the geographic wage differentials
guaranteed annual wage increases
changes in the seniority system
social insurance program
union shop
changes in grievance procedure
protection against modification of local plant work
rule agreements. 121

For a discussion on wage negotiations between 1937-1959
see Robert E. Livernash, Collective Bargaining In The Basic
steel Industry: A study of the Public Interest and the Role
of Government (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Labor 1961),
237-307; and for a discussion of negotiations between 19461959 see William T. Hogan, Economic History of the Iron and
steel Industry in the United states. Volume 4: Part VI,
(Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., 1971), 1611-1637.
125
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0ther items for negotiations would be: changes in
overtime computation; improved reporting allowance; severance
pay; improvement in vacation and premium rates for work on
holidays; changes in job scheduling and safety provisions;
time and one-half for Saturday work and double time for Sunday
work.
Livernash, Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel
Industry, 254.
121
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The environment continues to change.

The steel industry

began to expand again in the 1950's during the Korean War.
steel production in the United States increased from ninetyseven million tons in 1950, to 112 million tons in 1953 . 129
Presidential action during the war, seized the steel mills . 129
This was the first and only time it has occurred.

The Supreme

court later found the seizure to be unconstitutional, 130 but
this action disrupted the collective bargaining process.
Along

with

government

intervention,

another

factor

influenced the environment,

technical advancement in steel

production.

and

Between

1950

1960

the

steel

increased its capacity almost fifty percent,
148. 6 million tons. 131

industry

from 99.4 to

This effected collective bargaining.

The first steps toward industry-wide bargaining began in
1955 when the union announced David J. McDonald would chair
each of the union's negotiating committees, to lend uniformity
to the contracts.
Steel

In 1956 major steel companies formed the

Coordinating

Bethlehem Steel;

Committee:

Inland Steel;

Allegheny-Ludlum
Jones

Steel;

and Laughlin Steel;

128

Eldon S. Hendriksen, Capital Expenditures in the Steel
Industry. 1900-1953 (New York: Arno Co., 1978), 69.
129
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Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 73
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Republic

Steel;

and

Youngstown

Sheet

and

Tube. 132

This

committee had four representatives which bargained with the
union on major issues.

U.S. Steel had two members, Bethlehem

steel had one and Republic one.
now in place.

Industry-wide bargaining was

In 1959 these same representatives wanted to

bargain on all contract terms, not just major issues, but the
union declined, taking the position that they wanted to leave
the less important issues to the individual bargaining units.
On July 15, 1959, 500,000 workers went on strike, closing
doors on eighty-five percent of the nation's steel capacity. 133
This strike lasted 116 days.

It was the longest in history.

The environment leading to this was marked with high economic
inflation and over five million people unemployed. 134

The

unions anticipated that the technological changes in the steel
industry would lead to layoffs.

Industry management was

concerned about employment costs resulting from the 1956 labor
agreement, foreign competition and inflation.

Both parties

negotiated for ten weeks without reaching an agreement.

On

The remaining members of the Steel Coordinating
Committee were: Armco Steel Corporation; The Colorado Fuel and
Iron Corporation; Great Lakes Steel Corporation; Kaiser Steel
Corporation. National Council of the Church of Christ in the
United States of America, In Search of Maturity in Industrial
Relations (New York: Office of Publication and Distribution,
1960), 27.
132

133

Ibid., 30.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1959 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1959), 204.
134
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October 21, 1959 President Eisenhower ended the strike under
Taft-Hartley135 and on November 7, the Supreme Court upheld the
injunction. 136
116 days.

The longest industry-wide strike ended after

When the strike was settled, the new collective

agreement provided for wage and benefit increases, a long-term
study on work-practices, and the establishment of a Human
Relations Committee to deal with employee problems.
status of the Black Worker Post World War II
At the end of World War II, war industries began cutting
back in production.

In the steel industry the blacks were

the first ones to lose their jobs.

The FEPC began to lose its

importance and by 1946 it was dissolved.

Even though the FEPC

had no direct enforcement power, it provided the black worker
the opportunity 1 i tigate against employers and unions.
would be

another

two

decades

before

legislation

It

against

employment discrimination would be enacted.
Unions had their share of problems in integrating their
members.

Blacks

began,

after

World War

II,

to

try to

eliminate racially segregated seniority rosters. 137 These were
61
(1982).
135

Stat.

136

(1947),

as

amended,

29 u.s.c.

§

206

136

United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361
U.S. 39 (1959).

See for example, Local 53 Heat & Frost Insulators v.
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1959); Whitfield v. United
Steelworkers, 263 F.2d 546, 551 (5th Cir.) ~. denied 360
U.S. 902 (1959); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, 279 F.Supp 505
(E.D. Va. 1968); U.S. v. Sheetmetal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d
123 (8th Cir. 1969); Local 189, United Paperworkers v. U.S.,
u
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supported

by

racially

segregated

unions

including

the

steelworkers Union . 138
At the end of World War II, the AFL had established a
record of

accepting segregated unions.

convention,

At the

1946 AFL

a resolution endorsing Federal Fair Employment

Practices legislation passed only after "and labor unions" was
deleted from a motion calling for the end of race,

color,

religion, and national origin discrimination in industry and
labor unions.
The

CIO's

efforts

on

the

commitment in fighting racism.

other

hand,

showed

more

Their success in organizing

the black workers and did more to eliminate racial barriers
by bringing them into the realm of union membership.
wages,

benefits

and

job

security

improvements for the black worker.

were

needed

Better
economic

The CIO also made the

issue of union racial policies highly visible.

Their first

attempt in persuading President Roosevelt to adopt the FEPC
proved to be unsuccessful.

Yet once the FEPC was created, the

CIO proved to be one of its strongest supporters. 139

When the

two unions merged the AFL-CIO in 1955, the new federation

416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969) cert. denied 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
138

The issue of segregated seniority rosters was most
prominent in the following unions: Oil Workers; Pulp, Sulphite
and Paper Mill Worker; Paperworkers; Rubber Workers. Julius
Jacobson, ed. , The Negro and the American Labor Movement
(Gaulen City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1968), 150.
139
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signed a Merger Agreement statement saying that the

new

federation
Shall constitutionally recognize the rights of all
workers without regard to race, creed, or national
origin to share in the full benefits of trade union
organizations in the merged federation. The merged
federation shall establish appropriate internal
machinery to bring about, at the earliest possible
date, the effective implementation of this principle
of non-discrimination."0
After the merger the new federations commitment to civil
rights was unknown.

Michael J. Quill, a CIO vice-president

and president of the Transport Workers Union criticized the
statement as "weak and vague. 11141
the

AFL

had

openly

condemned

Until the time of the merger
disciplinary

policies

and

practices for some of its affiliates but had not taken any
action against them for discrimination.

The CIO, with a

Committee for Civil Rights failed to take any action against
employers practicing discrimination. An inconsistency between
published statements and practice continued.
Unions perpetuated employment segregation by maintaining
segregated seniority rosters and restricting blacks to certain
menial

jobs. 142

An

example

of

this

inequality

was

situation with the United Steelworkers of America (USWA).

the
In

1957 the Homestead, Pennsylvania local of the USWA, received

"°Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 312.
Philip Taft, The A.F. of L. from the Death of Gompers
to the Merger (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), 312.
141

See,
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example,
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142
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a complaint that black members were discriminated against in
the local.

The union had a policy of keeping black workers

in the three lowest of the thirty-two wage classification.
In the

same year,

a

group of

black steelworkers

in

Pittsburgh, formed an organization called the Fair Share Group
of Steel Workers.

As union members they wanted their "fair

share of jobs and benefits."

The organization wrote to David

McDonald, President of the USWA and George Meany, complaining
about treatment of blacks throughout the industry and asked
for

action.

Other

locals

establishing similar groups.

with

black

members

began

At the same time black auto

workers were beginning to discuss similar grievances to their
union through the Trade Union Leadership Council.

These

activities did not receive much attention outside the unions,
but they did gain the attention of the NAACP.
continued their fight for equality in the unions.

The NAACP
In 1961

the NAACP published a report on the first five years of the
AFL-CIO, concluding that apart from some changes they had not
accomplished as much as people had been led to believe.
. . . the national labor organization has failed to
eliminate the broad pattern of racial discrimination
and segregation in many important affiliated unions
• . • Efforts to eliminate discriminatory practices
within trade unions have been piecemeal and
inadequate and usually the result of protest by
civil rights agencies acting on behalf of negro
workers.
The national AFL-CIO has repeatedly
refused to take action on its own initiative . . .
Discriminatory racial practices by trade unions are
not simply isolated or occasional expressions of
local bias against colored workers, but rather as
the record indicates,
a continuation of the
institutionalized pattern of anti-negro employment
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practices that is traditional with large sections
of organized labor and individual management • 143
In 1962, Local 2401 of the USWA was charged by the NAACP
with establishing separate job classification and wage scales
for black and white workers doing the same work and providing
in the collective bargaining agreement for separate lines of
promotion and confining blacks to unskilled low paying jobs.
Charges such as this continued to be filed.iu
steel Industry Consent Decree
In 1974 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
the Secretary of Labor filed a suit against nine major steel
t

companies and the USWA alleging race, sex and national origin
discrimination in hiring and job assignments. 145

The legal

document charged that minorities and women were restricted to
the lowest paying jobs with no room for advancement.

The USWA

Herbert Hill, "Racism Within Organized Labor," Journal
of Negro Education, 30 Spring 1961, 109-118.
143

"'For a discussion of occupational segregation see, for
example, Francine D. Blau, The Economics of Women. Men and
~ (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1986); Herbert R.
Northrup and Richard L. Rowan, The Negro and Employment
Opportunities: Problems and Practices (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan, 1965), ,4-64; Herbert R. Northrup, Negro
Employment in Basic Industry; A Study of Racial Policies in
Six Industries. Volume I. Studies of Negro Employment
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1970), 11-38.
145

The companies are: Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc.,
Armco Steel Corporation, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corporation, National steel Corporation,
Republic Steel Corporation, United States Steel Corporation,
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation and Youngstown Sheet and
Tube company.
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was

included

for

formulating

a

discriminatory

collective

bargaining agreement which established a seniority system for
promotions,

layoffs,

recall and transfer,

which adversely

effected minorities and women.
The suit involved approximately 240-250 plants and more
than 300,000 employees.
two consent decrees.

The final outcome was the signing of

Consent Decree I covered issues which

fell under collective bargaining and called for substantive
relief in the following areas:
1.

Implementation of broad plantwide seniority,
along with transfers and testing reforms, and
adoption of ongoing mechanisms to reform
seniority,
departmental,
and
line
of
progression structures, which were to be
designed
to
correct
past
discriminatory
assignments.;

2.

Establishment of goals and timetables to
increase utilization of minorities and women
in occupations and job categories from which
they were excluded from the past;

3.

Establishment of a back pay fund of $30, 940, 000
to be paid to the minorities and women which
were discriminated against . 146

Consent Decree II dealt with employment issues which were
controlled
bargaining.

by

the
It

company and
required

not

the

subject
companies

to
to

collective
initiate

affirmative action programs in hiring, promotion, management
training, initial assignments and recruitment of minorities

146

Uni ted States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, :inc., et
al., C.A. Ala. 1975, 517 F. 2d 826, ~- denied 96 s. ct.
1684, 425 U.S. 944, 48 L.Ed.2d 187.
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and women • 147
The Consent Decree addressed the unlawful discriminatory
employment

practices

companies.

such

engaged

by

practices

the

USWA

negatively

and

effected

integration of black workers into the workforce.
and promotional
programs,

the

steel
the

Limited job

opportunities and exclusion from training

prevented blacks

from

reaching . parity with the

white workers.
Inland

Steel

was

included in this suit.

one

of

the

major

steel

companies

When the suit was originally filed

Inland analyzed their workforce
and personnel policies.
t

They

discovered their workforce was evenly distributed in most of
the job classifications identified by the EEOC.

In addition,

their

were

human

resources

policies

and

programs

fairly

applied.

The human resources personnel department presented

Inland' s

case

company

not

to

the

president

sign

the

Consent

and

recommended that

Decree.

After

the

thoroughly

examining the information presented to him, he agreed.
Early EEO Public Policy
Franklin Roosevelt created the first
Practice Committee (FEPC) in 1941.

147

Fair Employment

The FEPC had the power to

Ibid. See, for example, Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S.
424 (1970); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979); LaRiviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982);
Minnick v. California Department of Corrections, 95 Cal. App.
3d 506, 157 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1979) ~. dismissed for want of
finality, 452 u.s. 105, 101 s.ct. 2211, 68 L.Ed. 2d 706
(1981).
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investigate

complaints
This

industries.

first

of

discrimination

in

the

defense

FEPC was overpowered by southern

politicians, railroad unions and employers.

A second FEPC

was created with a new Executive Order in 1943, this time
placing it under the Office of Emergency Management, but it
too proved to be ineffective.
In 1953 President Eisenhower established the Presidents
The Committee's

Committee on Government Contracts (PCGC).

goal was to establish equal employment opportunity for people
employed

or

government

seeking

employment,

contracts.

One

way

in
the

agencies
Committee

covered

by

sought

to

achieve this objective was by making it the responsibility of
the

head

of

each

federal

government

agency

to

obtain

compliance with the nondiscrimination clause in any contract
or subcontract entered into by that agency.
did not have government contracts ,

Because unions

the Committee took the

position that it did not have any jurisdiction over labor
organizations.

This was hard to ignore because many aspects

of employment were influenced by unions.

The PCGC did a

study and found that between 1953-1956 unions were directly
or indirectly involved in over twenty percent of the cases
received by the Committee. 148

In addition the study discovered

the following:
1.

148

All complaints, except one which alleged
discrimination against Spanish-Americans, by

Ray Marshall, The Negro And Organized Labor (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1965), 221.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

a railroad and railway brotherhood, were for
discrimination against blacks.
Charges included denial of membership to
blacks, thereby forcing companies to discharge
them.
Refusal by a company to hire a black because
he could not get into a union.
Restricting blacks to certain departments and
excluding them from apprenticeship training
programs.
Violation of seniority rights.
Providing in the contract for separate lines
of progression for blacks and whites.
Failure of a union to protest seniority
violations.
Refusal to file charges against the company for
failing to promote or hire blacks in categories
other than labor janitors. 149

Despite its findings, the PCGC had relatively no impact
on the unions.

Their power was limited.

Lack of federal

funding an inefficient enforcement structure produced very
few results.
In 1961 President Kennedy appointed a Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity
contractors

to

submit

(PCEEO)

giving it power to require

compliance

reports

which

gave

information concerning the racial practices of the unions
with which they were dealing.

The PCEEO now also had the

authority to request that contractors:
Provide statements in writing from a labor union
together with supporting information, to the effect
that it said labor union's •
• practices and
polices do not discriminate on the grounds of race,
color, creed, or national origin, and that the labor
union
or
representative
will
affirmatively
cooperate, within the limits of his legal and
contractual authority, in the implementation of the
policy and provisions of this order, or that it
consents and agrees that recruitment, employment,
149.Ib..i_g •
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and the terms and conditions of employment under
the proposed contract shall be in accordance with
the purpose and provisions of this order. 150
The PCEEO adopted a program to have unions as well as
contractors sign a "Plans for Progress" which was designed to
open employment and promotion opportunities to blacks.

In

June, 1964 eleven steel companies entered into a Plans for
Armco,

Progress:
Colorado

Fuel

and

Bethlehem,
Iron,

Jones

Great
and

Lakes

Steel,

Laughlin,

Inland,

Pittsburgh,

Republic, United States Steel, Wheeling, Youngstown Sheet and
Tube. 151

That same month these same companies entered into a

nondiscrimination agreement with the USWA.
The policy statements of the companies generally read as
follows:
It is the policy of the Corporation to seek and
employ the best qualified personnel in all its
facilities and at all of its working locations; to
provide equal opportunities for the advancement of
employees including upgrading,
promotion,
and
training; and to conduct these activities in a
manner which will not discriminate against any
person because of race, color, creed, or national
origin. 154
Along with such a statement the plans included dissemination
of the policy, identifying who was going to be responsible for
implementation, recruitment, training and placement.
"Plans

for

Progress"

was

voluntary

and

imposed

no

lSOibid • I 226 •
151

Northrup, Negro Employment in Basic Industry, 320.

mibid., 321, as cited in U.S. Steel News, July, 1964.
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sanctions.

It was not until the passage of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 153 and particularly Title VII, m
system

would

be

in

place

to

protect

discrimination and provide the power to
others

to

comply

with

the

law.

that a

individuals

enforce~

The

Civil

5

legal
from

and obtain
Rights

Act

prohibited discrimination in education, voting and employment.
Title VII,

which deals

with

equal

employment opportunity

states that labor unions are not:
1.

2.

3.

To exclude or to expel from its membership or
otherwise
to
discriminate
against
any
individual because of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.
To limit, segregate, or classify its membership
or to classify or fail
to refuse
for
employment
any individual , in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities, or would limit
such employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his/her status as an employee
or as an applicant for employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
To cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an individual in violation
of this section.~
6

3

~ 42

u.s.c. § 2oooe, et seg.

~·§

703(a)(l) of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
155

See 1972 Amendments to Title VII regarding the EEOC's
enforcement powers.
~civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, sec. 703(c), 42
USC§ 2000e-2(c).
1
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The

evolution

of

public

policy

to

eradicate

discrimination has gone from "window-dressing" to actually
enforcing compliance, by both businesses and unions. Despite
the National Labor Relations Act, Civil Rights Act, Title VII
and Executive Order 11246, discrimination still exists.

Of

the nine steel companies involved in the 1974 steel Consent
Decree, Armco Steel Corporation, Bethlehem Steel Corporation,
Jones

and

Corporation,

Laughlin
United

Steel
States

Corporation,
Steel

Republic

Corporation,

Steel

Wheeling-

Pittsburgh Steel Corporation and Youngstown Sheet and Tube,
were part of the eleven companies which had entered into a
"Plans

for

Progress,"

and

signed

a

nondiscrimination

agreement with the USWA in 1964.
Today there is recourse for those who believe that they
have been discriminated against

in employment.

With the

passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and particularly
Title VII, disenfranchised individuals have a formal recourse
to redress their rights. 157

The enactment of Title VII and the

Supreme Courts decision in Brown v.

Board of Education, 158

combined with a courageous federal court system, created a
new employment environment.
As in Kochan's model, the external climate created this

157

See Michele M. Hoyman and Lamont E. Stallworth, "Who
Files suit and Why:
An Empirical Portrait of the Litigious
Worker," University of Illinois Law Review ( 1981): 11·5-159.
m347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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resulted

in

businesses changing their industrial relations systems.

In

new

turn,

employment

new

These

environment.

employment

policies,

laws

hiring

and

promotion

practices, also led to modifications in union contracts.
steel

industry,

unions

and

the

government

are

the

The
three

parties which Kochan identified as needing to be present in
an industrial relations system.

The external environment

proved to be the catalyst in creating more progressive labormanagement relations.

CHAPTER 5
INLAND STEEL POST WORLD WAR II
workforce
During the period of time between 1945 and 1974 the steel
companies experienced a more powerful United steelworkers
Union, the establishment of the Steel Commission and greater
numbers of blacks in the workforce.

Also during this period,

Inland Steel was also subject to environmental factors such
as Title VII.

Similar to other steel companies, Inland had

a more diverse workforce which was required to successfully
integrate.
The demand for labor in the steel industry increased in
1941 due to the onset of World War II.

As experienced during

World War I, the methods of hiring and training were similar.
Frank

Cassel,

retired

Director

of

Industrial

Relations

recollects:
The great stories, none of which I can confirm, but
which I think are fairly true is that the method of
hiring in the Depression was to take one of six guys
and you would throw six half dollars into the crowd
and the six guys who came out with the half dollars
were hired. And when you hired a roller or melter,
in those days you hired the roller and he brought
his own crew and you paid him and his own crew, he's
an entrepreneur.
78

79
The employment office didn't begin to grow until
World War II.
World War II created the real
personnel function, because what it did, it required
manning tables from every company. And you had to
tell the government of who the people were on your
payroll; and who was going to replace them when they
were drafted for the war; and what provisions you
had made; and you had to have a plan that was
approved by the Federal Manpower Agency in the war
so that the company wouldn't shut down if you
drafted people; and so you had to have key people.
And that really started the companies in some kind
of personnel planning.
It was the war that
started. 159
Minority Workforce
Cassel shares his beliefs as to why Inland experienced
a labor shortage when World

W~r

II began:

Yes, during World War II there was a similar influx
of workers as there had been in World War I. We had
more women and Mexicans working in the mills again.
World war II was the period in which women made the
greatest gains in the mills.
By that time the
military was drafting blacks and Mexicans.
The
reason they weren't drafting them in World War I is
that they couldn't pass the Army intelligence test.
The army intelligence test is a pencil and paper
test.
And most of the blacks and Mexicans were
illiterate . 160
Cassel mentioned that Mexicans were "imported" from the
American side of the border.

In his conversation he continues

to provide a profile of Inland's Hispanic workforce during
World War II:
They came here as illegals, and nobody ever did
anything about them. In fact, if you look at East
Chicago, Indiana very, very closely, you' 11 find
159

Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston,

IL.
16

°Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston,

IL.
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three layers of Mexicans.
You' 11 find the real
original layer, that came and worked, and that are
now the supervisors and managers, in the mills -now not all of them, but some of them are. It took
them all of those years up till the present to get
this far.
Another layer that came from Mexico in World War
II.~
But there is a third layer [of Hispanics],
who came from New York.
And they came to Inland
from Puerto Rico, via New York. They couldn't find
work in New York. 162
1

Bill
Relations
workforce.

Dillon,
agrees

retired
with

Vice-President

Cassel's

analysis

of

of

Industrial

the

Hispanic

Dillon shares his thoughts regarding the hiring

of minorities in Inland Steel:
In the war years, they had a lot of Mexican
[Hispanic] people coming in - Puerto Rican people.
The Mexicans stayed, the Puerto Ricans never really
adjusted particularly to that environment. But our
numbers were always something like 60-20-20.
60%
White, 20% Black, 20% Hispanic.
And we now have
third and fourth, and fifth generation of mostly
the Mexican background people.
Mostly the Mexicans
stayed, the Puerto Ricans, this is before I got
there, but I'm told that they brought them in during
the war, but they never really adjusted to that
environment.
They were there, they made a few
bucks and then they took off.
The MexicanAmericans, they really made a very solid foundation
in terms of a community there in East Chicago and

161

For a discussion of Mexican labor in the United States
during this era see e.g. Manuel P. Servin, An Awakening
Minority: The Mexican-Ainericans (Beverly Hills: Glencoe Press,
1974); George C. Kiser and Martha Woody Kiser, Mexican Workers
in the United States (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 19 7 9) ; Richard Craig, The Bracero Program (Austin:
University of Texas, 1971).
mFrank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston,

IL.
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have been very successful . 163
Inland also had a multi-culturally diverse workforce,
some which came from Western Europe.

Cassel describes one of

their employees:
In fact, in World War II, Inland got a substantial
number of refugees from Western Europe.
Refugees
from Germany.
Who had Ph.D.'s and were doctors,
and couldn't get hired in American academic
institutions or could not practice medicine, who
became
part
of
the
Inland
Steel
chemistry
department. In fact one of the Union leaders during
that time, was a man by the name of Frank Kretz, who
was an Austrian.
Kretz, had a Ph.D. in chemistry
and he was also a doctor, an M.D. He couldn't get
a license to practice in this country. And he and
his family fled Germany and gone to Argentina and
from Argentina to the United States. And ended up
in our chemistry department.
And then became an
active official of the Steelworkers Union. 164
Women in the Workforce
Due to the labor shortage created during the war, women
Pete Calecci comments on

were brought into the workforce.

their role at Inland during World War II:
As you can imagine, when men were drafted into the
armed services, for World War II a lot of women
began to get hired. As the men came back they began
to lay off women on the basis on whomever they
replaced. This was not proper, because you do this
on the basis of service . 1 ' 5
Women were hired into nontraditional jobs.

163

The state

Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago,

IL.
164

Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston,

IL.
165

Pete Calecci,
Chicago, IN.

Interview

on

August

2,

1989,

East
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laws which had previously prevented them from working such
jobs were relaxed during the war . 166

Dillon reiterates women's

roles:
The role of women is funny in the steel industry.
During the war - World War II - they brought women
into the steel industry. They did just about every
job - running crane . . . They did almost every job
in the steel industry. 167
Well, the day the war
ended the women were just pushed out.
All of a
sudden there were no women. The war is over now.
We don't need you. Basically that is what happened.
As soon as the guys got back - the women were out.
It wasn't until these later years - when the civil
Rights movement started up - you started getting
more women . 168
Work Stoppages and Issues
After World War II the War Labor Board removed their wage
controls.

Between 1946-1959, Inland experienced twelve work

stoppages. The sources of these conflicts would be due to wage
disputes and social insurance programs.

There was one major

change in these strikes from those of previous years, and this
was that the relationship between industry and the union had
evolved from being adversarial to being more cooperative.
Bill Dillon recalls:
1946-1950's there were strikes every two years and
that is when coordinated bargaining came into
Stall Worth I
Grievances," 106.
166

"The

Arbitration

of

Discrimination

167

See, for example, Jean T. McKelvey, "Sex and the Single
Arbitrator," Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting
of the National Academy of Arbitrators (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of National Affairs, 1971).
161

IL.
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being. 169 That is when the industry and the union
got together and said "Why don't we try and do this
on an industry wide basis." And that is where the
coordinated bargaining came in 1956 - I think. 1 ' 0
When we decided we would bargain on a coordinated
basis . 171
The

steel

industry

would

use

coordinated

during contract negotiations with the USWA.
any

policies

that

evolved

out

of

these

bargaining

When asked if
strikes

Dillon

responded:
The only thing that evolved out of the strikes was
the idea that there had to be a better way to do it
rather than by individual companies. So that we'll
do it as a coordinated group.
And of course, the
companies wanted that to some degree because you
could make a settlement with, for example, U.S.
Steel and Bethlehem.
And now here is Inland, and you came to Inland on
these local issues.
We want more money or you're
gonna be on strike and that put a burden on Inland,
169

0ne of the goals of the Steelworkers union was to
institute coordinated bargaining, which in the steel industry
became industrywide bargaining.
The Steelworkers union
attempts
to
institute
coordinated
bargaining
proved
unsuccessful until 1956. Prior to this the union was unable
to overcome industry opposition. Because U.S. Steel was the
largest company, they would sign the initial contract and the
remaining steel companies followed suit.
By 1956, the
environment had significantly changed.
At this time, the
major steel companies had their representatives bargain with
the union on major issues.
The ultimate agreement would be
with all of the companies represented. The bargaining of the
lesser issues would be left to the individual companies and
the local unions.
Paul A. Tiffany, The Decline of American
Steel: How Management. Labor. and Government Went Wrong (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 150.
~see, for example, National Council of the Church of
Christ, In Search of Maturity in Industrial Relations, 27;
Livernash, Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry,
297.
171

IL.

Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago,
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because we were a one plant company.
Now see at
U.S. Steel and Bethlehem they had plants all over
the country and they could have strikes on local
issues in Birmingham and nothing in Pittsburgh. But
Inland, when we had a strike we were out of
business.
So we were really at risk all of those
times. It just so happened that there were strikes
going on all over the country.
But in those days there was a philosophy - an
economic philosophy - that steel strikes hurt the
economy of the U.S.
Everybody believed it.
And
that is when they started to say, o.k. lets do it
a different way, lets have a coordinated bargaining
and that's where you ended up with the largest
companies, U.S. Steel, Republic, and Bethlehem,
sitting at the top across the table from the Abels
and McDonalds, to negotiate the contract.
And after that you've got the coordinating
committee.
In theory this is where we were - the
Bill Caples - and while they were meeting with the
union so were we, and they would come back and tell
us what the union said. We had sub-committees too,
for example benefits and seniority.
They'd come
back and in theory discuss what they were going to
do and give you some input, but minimal.
This is
why Inland with the one plant was better off in that
system, because if there was a strike, it was a
national strike and everybody was out, not just us.
So that we benef i tted to that extent and then
usually after you had a national strike you had a
settlement so that was the benefit to us in going
along with this, although we did lose some of our
economy in negotiating.
You had not only the
economics, but you also had the basic - other basic
contract issues like contracting out and incentives
and those were what we called top table items.
You had input, but it was not perfect by a long
shot.
The companies that were not sitting at the
top table, were really not satisfied but it was more
"What else can you do.
They are going to do what
they want, they are going to make the deal and when
they want to make it, its going to be made. 11112
The steel

112

IL.

companies began coordinated bargaining,

or

Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago,
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industrywide bargaining,

in 1956.

During this period the

issue of nondiscrimination clauses in the labor contracts was
not addressed.
would

take

Individual companies, such as Inland Steel,

the

lead

and

include

such

clauses

in

their

contracts prior to 1964.
Race Relations
Race relation problems continued to exist both during and
after World War II.
manner

in

which

Cassel shared his views concerning the
minorities

were

treated

in

the

work

environment:
There was a book publ.lshed about 1958, by the
University of Chicago Press. 173 The guy that did the
research did it in the '50's. So what I'm telling
you about the race relationship in the 50's, will
give you some idea of what it might have been like
in World War II. Because you may recall that World
War II had come, Harry Truman had ordered that an
on all government contracts, this was an Executive
Order, you could not discriminate against people.
This was well before the Civil Rights Act of the
1960's.
These are interviews taken around 1954. Negroes and
Mexicans comprised about a third of the production
force in the mill.
None of the Negroes and only
one of the Mexicans believed they could ever become
a foreman. Negroes asserted that they don't promote
colored, whereas Mexicans usually described their
lack of opportunity due to poor education and their
lack of command of the English language.
What is interesting, in light of the present day,
is that one of the Negroes, even argued that
discrimination on race, prevented workers from
getting promoted.

173

Joel Siedman, Jack London, Bernard Karsh and Daisy L.
Taglia-Cozzo, The Worker Views His Union (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1958).
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Some of the workers of Eastern European birth
complained that they were discriminated against.
One said "I'm a hunky, and a hunky has no chance."
I'll tell you about race relations in the 50's.
Some of the workers of Eastern European birth
complained that they were discriminated against.
And since I worked out there I can tell you fabulous
stories about the ladder of discrimination by ethnic
group and by race - with everybody in the mill
trying to look down on everybody else.
Until the blacks and Hispanics came along, everybody
had managed to put the Poles and the Croatians, at
the bottom of the ladder.
But when the Hispanics
and blacks showed up in numbers, the Poles managed
to put them in the bottom of the ladder.
We had
many, many, many, racial disputes in the mill
between ethnics and blacks and Hispanics. And one
of the problems of that is that it became a
management problem, because very often the union
was of no help because there was nothing in the
contract except to fire them all for fighting. See
there was no solution to the problem. We had white
guys, who would go around with ascedline torches
and stick them in the nose of the locker and burn
the clothes up of the newcoming workers whether they
were southern whites, or whether they were blacks,
or whether they were hispanics. Anybody new coming
into the mill.
Now you can say the company won't discriminate, but
there was nothing in the labor agreement that
covered it. And very often the union guy was caught
between his own membership.
He was unable to do
very much. 174
Calecci, who worked in the mill agreed that the worker,
not the company, discriminated against the employees.

When

asked if he felt there was any discrimination at work or in
the union, he responded:
At Inland it was al together different. Let me point
this out to you. There is no way that I can prove
174
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it to you but
let's take a company like
Youngstown.
Youngstown hired more blacks than
Latinos and their reason was I believe that blacks
knew the English language and could converse with
them.
Inland had just the opposite as to what Youngstown
had. Youngstown had more blacks and Inland had more
Latinos.
I think that Inland has been given - and rightly so
- some credit to embracing the Latinos. But there
is also this to it and that is that the Latinos
lived along the area where Inland's plant was so
they could walk to work.
So sure there were some problems at first, because
they didn't understand English.
Discrimination had a big role in the unions trying
to get to the worker.
"Damn fool they are
discriminating against you because you're a Latino
or Black."
And they themselves could see this
discrimination.
For example, they could see a
foreman sneaking around just to see what you were
doing.
We in our own ways established Spanish speaking
committees. Where the committees would met with the
respective representatives from each department and
try to determine what mode of discrimination was
being practiced in that department.
One of the departments - the blooming mill - there
were two shifts with bus transportation inside the
plant from and to the department we worked at. So
the 8 [p.m.]-4 [a.m.] nights a bus would be waiting
for these people and take them to wash up, get on
the bus to take them where they needed to clock out.
What was happening was that the Latinos would not
be able to enter the locker room and wash up until
after the whites were finished.
All of a sudden there are complaints, because the
whites had to wait for them to get on the bus. They
knew damn well the union was watching the situation
and so they could not tell them they had to be there
a certain time or the bus would leave them, they had
to treat everyone the same.
So what happens, is
that the white people tell them to go ahead and
change clothes, because they did not want to wait
any longer than they had too. So then the Latinos
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began to share all of the facilities.
It wasn't
Inland that discriminated - it was the worker.
At Youngstown - while I don't know so much about it
because I worked at Inland, they had discrimination
too and they even had it worse than at Inland
because the opportunity for promotion were even
worse at Youngstown. Because unless you were white
you were not promoted to the next job.
There were some complaint that arose with the East
Chicago Human Relations Commission where the
laborers,
practically all Mexican .- this at
Youngstown - Mexicans that used to help as brick
mortar laborers - had no chance of promotion - could
not even become brick layers. 175
Calecci

believed

that

between

the

1950s

and

1960s

minorities had better opportunities for advancement at Inland
than

at

other

employees

steel

displayed

'
companies.
such

Despite

deplorable

the

fact

behavior

white

towards

minorities, Calecci knew it was not condoned by management.
The fact management took action once they became aware of such
incidences, demonstrated their equitable treatment towards all
employees.
Inland had some human resources policies in place, yet
the environment was such that these policies were considered
harsh.

Cassel recalls some of these earlier policies:

Oh yes, we had policies that were very strict, we
fired them.
When we found a guy doing something
like that, we fired them on the spot. Very strict
with you. We fired quite a few. We caught one guy
in a crane chasing a guy with a load of steel trying
to kill him because he didn't like him - it was a
black guy. The guy would run down one aisle and the
guy would run his crane over and try to drop the
load on him.
175
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The company had very strict policies, we just fired
them right on the spot.
And very frequently we
fired both participants.
That's where it became
quite unfair.
But we had no way of dealing with
it. Frequently, we had no witnesses to tell us who
started the fight. We tried to mediate a dispute,
where a white guy beat the hell out of
some
southern hillbillies and I ended up firing all of
them.
So when you say you have polices, what policies do
you have? Things were pretty rough in those days. 176
If any policy is to be successful
management's support.

it must have top

During this era "equal employment" was

nonexistent, yet Inland was a company which appeared to be
committed to civil rights.

When asked if, and why, Inland's

upper management wished to eradicate race discrimination,
Cassel replied:
Intellectually yes. The very powerful influence in
the company were the Block family.
Joseph, L.E.,
[and] Phillip D. Block.
They had - there father
had - founded the company, and they were German
Jews, liberals.
You have to understand some
differences between German Jewish, Polish Jewish
and Russian Jewish, in the immigration.
These
people were liberals, in the sense that they really
believed in democracy.
I believe that they
believed, that ethnic and racial discrimination was
wrong . 177
Sometimes management support is not enough.

If first

line supervisors are equally committed then the integration
of the workforce would not be successful.

Cassel described
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how minority employees were sometimes treated:
We even had discrimination against Jews, as well as
blacks and Hispanics in the mill.
And some of it
violent.
These guys didn't play for fun, they
played for keeps.
In the case of one case we had,
we had a Jewish kid who was driving a pick-up truck
because he was picking up stuff and another guy in
a truck who tried to shove him in front of a train,
going through the mill. The mill is full of trains.
We had all these incidents with blacks and with
Hispanics.
So there was that sort o~ thing that
existed.
But what really developed was not the
attitude of the people as much as the labor
178
shortage, that began to develop in the late .
Minority employees had no legal recourse for this kind
of

treatment.

The

company

may

have

had

policies

and

management's commitment, but 'if first line supervisors were
not

as

equally

continue.

committed,

situations

such

as

this

would

With the passing of Title VII, this type of blatant

discrimination would eventually diminish.
Company Programs
Many corporations took a proactive approach in dealing
with race discrimination, by developing comprehensive minority
recruitment

programs,

programs. 179

In further conversation Cassel spoke of some of

178

and

training,

or

loan-management
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For example, companies such as International Harvester
Company and Western Electric implemented a recruitment program
with black high schools and colleges.
Honeywell, Inc.
provided summer employment to black faculty so that the
company could work with the university to prepare a curriculum
to meet the future demand for people in the technical field.
Northrup, The Negro and Employment Opportunities, 111-145.
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the programs Inland instituted:
They loaned me for six months to the National AntiDefamation League to study ethnic and racial
discrimination, in hotels. It turned out there was
substantial anti-semitism against hotel owners
refusal to hire Jews.
There was a blatant refusal to hire Jews in the
steel industry.
I was in a meeting with some
executive of Republic Steel and I
had some
colleagues with me and we were discussing a problem
and we disagreed with the other steel companies,
and a fellow I knew very well, lost his temper and
he said, "That's all you can expect from a goddam
Jew company." He represented Republic Steel.
But for the Anti-Defamation League, I looked at
hotels and I looked at steel and Inland was the only
one who had Jews in high executive offices. One of
the most remarkable things, but one of the worst
discriminators of Jews was a hotel chain, by the
name of Sheine.
The Sheine family, was Jewish
itself. Sheine was one-half of the team of SheineCoehn who aided Senator McCarthy in his hearings.
Inland people, the support.
- I used to make
speeches in those days that you had to have topmanagement support and I still believe that, but it
was very thin. It was among people like the Blocks.
I don't think, for instance, it extended to the
general managers, for the plant, who had more power
than they did, over people's lives. 180
The conversation revealed the discrimination faced by the
Jews.

Though some would not consider them to be a minority

for equal employment opportunity purposes,

Title VII does

cover religion.

It is also important to remember that color

was

the determining

not always

factor

in

discrimination.

History provides many accounts of race discrimination.

Due

to the external environment, the only change was those who
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experienced its manifestation.
In

addition

to

management-loan

instituted other programs.

programs,

Inland

Cassel recalls several, one which

was a joint program founded by one of his employees and a
priest and another with Purdue University.
The steel mills were booming in the 1940's, after
World War II, and I came to Inland about 1948. And
one of the first things we did was to start a school
for Hispanics. We were getting a large number of
Hispanics who couldn't pass simple entrance tests
to come in and work for us. And the entrance test
was essentially the ability to read signs, the
ability to read stop and go signals, the ability to
take care of yourself safely. The steel mill is a
hard place in which to work, and you're always
threatened with danger, and we had had too many
fa tali ties. So it fell to me to get something going
on that.
I had a guy working for me, who came up
with an idea - he and a local priest invented
something called Dehon College. And between the two
of them they got a college started for Hispanic
families to teach the father the elements he needed
in order to safely survive and promote whatever in
and else, and to provide general know-how about the
way life is lived in that community to the wives.
The husband and wife went to the school together and
we couldn't get the public schools to sponsor it and
so we footed the bill. That ran for several years.
And then we invented something else with Purdue
University called The Technical Institute, and then
the people went out of the Dehon College and into
the Technical Institute to learn higher skills. 181
Programs such as this benefited Hispanics and blacks.
Cassel continues to emphasize why he felt companies developed
such programs:
Yes, Hispanics [benefitted] mostly, but blacks went
to the Purdue program too, as did whites, everybody
did. But, I'm emphasizing something a lot of people
181
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wouldn't do.
I think there was commitment, but
there wasn't strong enough support up and down the
line to do anything significant, on a race relations
basis, until the labor shortage began to be felt.
After World War II steel business really boomed.
There was a pent up demand for steel during the war
and we needed labor, and that did more to get people
into the mills and get them started. We could use
the argument, hey, we're short of people, we've got
to do this.
It wasn't done out of anybody's

goodne~s.
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Management Union Relations
Inland' s

di verse

workforce

made

integration

difficult than if it had only one predominate race.

more

The many

ethnic groups, coupled with tenuous union relations, presented
a challenge to Inland's management.

Cassel spoke about this

situation:
See there were about fifty ethnic groups in the
plant, and most of them had strong nationalistic
tendencies.
And they tried to protect their own
little turf away from some other ethnic group and
frequently you would find foreman who were biased
in favor of lets say Poles. And everybody in that
department he had were Poles. So with the coming
of the union and seniority, we began to get rid of
that.
Then you find some other foreman who would hire just
Serbs. Serbs and Croations hate each other, even
today, with a passion.
Then we have political factions. And we had a blast
furnace strike that ended all the wildcats. We had
a wildcat going on in the blast furnace because of
a guy named Archie Green who was trying to make a
reputation for himself. So I went down town to see
Randall and took Caples in with me, because he was
my boss too. But I was making my own case. And I
u
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said "Look, we're going to keep on having wildcats
unless we take these guys on." And this was about
'53 or '54, and before I went downtown. And I said
"I think I can make it in three days," it would take
me three days to do it.
The plant will be shut
down, because if you shut the blast furnace down,
it shuts the supply of iron off from the open
hearth, and then that shuts the open hearth down,
and that shuts down the supply of steel for all the
rolling mills. So you've got a very key operation.
So - and I'll never forget the way Randall said it
to me - he said "Well o.k., but don't make any
mistakes."
Archie Green gave up, fortunately for me, within
three days. They haven't had a wildcat since.
They were mad at the bosses. Archie Green was also
using it as a platform, to become president of the
union.
t

So that in that case, I meant business,
even concerned about how Archie felt. 183

I wasn't

Integration at the Management Level
Inland

was

not

only

concerned

workforce at the

lower level,

achieving

representation

better

with

integrating

the

but equally concerned with
at

the

management

level.

Cassel recalled an incident regarding people's reactions when
he hired an Oriental for their research department:
Bill Caples and I hit upon the idea that we needed
a little internal research group in order to see
what we were doing.
Everything was being done by
the seat of the pants.
There was no body of
knowledge such as you can draw on.
So we hired a
research director.
But then, one of the first
applicants that came along was a Japanese. His name
was Sam Onoda. The research director said "I want
to hire this guy, he's good." So I said "Well lets
hire him. "
But my sixth sense said to me, we' re
going to have problems, because I knew that mill,
183
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like the back of my hand.
I was in charge of
industrial relations at the mill, during this time.
So I called up Caples and said "Hey we got a
Japanese guy. "
Now to Caples credit, he never
failed in these situations.
He was always strong
supporter.
But his power was inadequate.
But I
asked him "What do you think?" I said, "Would you
do me a favor and talk to Clarence Randall, and tell
him what I'm gonna do?"
Five minutes later he
called back and said "Clarence says its o.k."
So I had it lined up.
I said, "You know we might
have a strike on it." So he said "You can't have
a strike on just hiring Japanese." So we put him
on the payroll. I would say that within three days
I had a delegation in my off ice of half a dozen of
white collar workers from the accounting department
They said, we refuse to work with Sam Onoda because
he's Japanese. Now this is after World War II, so
there's also racial tensions to it. They said they
were going to walk out, they were going to strike.
The whole accounting department, several hundred of
them, were going to strike because we hired a Sam
Onoda.
So I said, "Well look, if you want to walk out, it's
o.k. with us, we'll get replacements."
And that
really stopped them cold. They hadn't anticipated
that kind of response, so they never walked out.
They kept pestering a little bit. And it all quieted
down. About six months later Sally Brown came to
my office and said "Can we have lunch?"
And she
said, "I've gotten acquainted with Sam, and you know
he's a pretty nice guy."
This will give you some idea of people's hostility
toward' s anybody brown, anybody yellow, anybody
black. And that is the world in which we lived.
Well, we used to take a personal beating in
Industrial Relations from the operating guys.
Because they said we were pushing this race stuff.
We were pushing these people off on them.
You'll
find that time after time people felt that the law
was bad, that they were being punished by the
government. 184
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Management Supports Efforts
Cassel had the support of Mr. Caples and upper management
in

making

hiring

unpopular.

decisions

which

were

considered

to

be

Despite the problems people such as Cassel faced,

management support was present.

When asked if he felt this

support was symbolic or real, Cassel responded:
I would have to say, in answer to your question,
yes , we did have top management's support. We took
a personal beating for adhering to a policy that
wasn't formalized in the law.
Remember this was
before 1962 and 1963. And that's how Inland began
to get a reputation in the community, in those
years, as a liberal company that was out ahead.
Well, we were out ahead/ because we were taking a
terrible beating inside. Because Caples and I and
a bunch of other guys who supported these policies,
were very unpopular in some of those years.
They
even mistrusted us I think in negotiations - thought
we would give something away in negotiations that
would harm them. But you have to remember -that the
people that felt most threatened in all of this were
the low level people, foremen and the people just
below, who were by and large first and second
generation immigrants from Europe. 185
In Kochan' s industrial relations model all elements react
to the environment.

As this process is taking place

the

developing system is taking its form from the individuals in
control.
and

In Inland's situation, individuals such as Caples

Cassel

employment.

were

progressive

on

their

views

of

equal

Cassel shared his views on how the environment,

and individuals such as Caples affected race relations at
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Inland:
It is related to kind of a freakish thing that
happened.
There were - Caples and I attracted
people who were more liberal to the department. We
were attracted to the top management, for different
reasons perhaps, but I think they thought we could
read and write and a few other things.
But the
fundamental thing was that the company's basic
attitude revolved about the liberalism of these
German Jews.
I wouldn't have survived, nor would
Caples.
Going along with this there was a powerful change
occurring in the labor management relations at the
time he was hired and the time I was hired. Because
prior to our time the labor relations at Inland and
at Little steel was nothing short of awful. Inland
was in the stage of conflict and containment. And
when I went in to interview, Randall told me, "I
want to change our policy. We don't want to be just
plain anti-union." He said "This is the time for
changing policy." He wasn't quite sure what that
policy would be. But he had one problem. When I
started work there in 1948, they were having a
wildcat strike a day. And that was because of the
decentralization of administration of justice to the
foreman.
That provided differential justice. In
one department you could get hung for an offense and
in another department you could get off scott free.
The thing that the union ultimately brought and that
Caples and I capitalized on was that the unions
function with us was to help the workers get a
modicum of justice. I was never under the illusion
that the union would raise wages, but I was clear
that they could provide justice to the workers.
But the big thing that unions can bring and which
continues to surprise me in the present milieu, is
a sense of justice, and a reality of justice in the
workplace,
that they [workers] couldn't get
otherwise. Because, without the union the employer
is the judge, jury, the prosecutor and the jailor.
He's everything. And there is no recourse.
I used to tell my class about the fact that if you,
walking down the street and you throw a brick in the
window you get hauled off to the police station and
they book you and they say "Well, get yourself an
attorney." And they read you your rights. You go
get an attorney and you appear before a judge whom
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you've never seen and he decides whether you're
guilty or not.
But if at Inland steel you threw a brick through a
window, you come to my department and we would judge
you guilty, barn -- and there was no recourse. Well
this was the shift. This is the profound shift in
industrial relations that was occurring in that
time, along with race relations. From what might
be called containment and conflict, to what I felt
was called arms length accommodation. Not too cozy,
but still accommodating legitimate interests of
workers and union. That was a profound change for
us that we pretty much lead the industry in doing
that.
But it kind of accompanied the whole race
relation things because these were all serious human
problems that needed something more significant than
rigid rule.
And then the third thing that began to occur - it's
about that time that the steel industry oligopoly
began to break down. Now Caples never admitted, nor
did Randall, admit we had an oligopoly. I say we
had one. And I think most scholars will support us.
What was interesting was - that the oligopoly had
controlled the whole domestic market.
The thing
that began to break it down in the 50's were imports
of steel from other countries. And the minute other
players entered the game it began to weaken the
oligopoly.
Now the steel industry is still trying to preserve
an oligopoly, but its having a terrible time doing
it. Because the steel people in general, put their
heads in the sand.
But
those
three
forces
were
occurring
simultaneously, so that meant that as this oligopoly
began to break down, the union could no longer
depend as it had in the past on hooking its wage
demands to fixed prices, that we passed along to the
consumer.
See, the union and the companies matched, not in so
many words, but they were in the ball game together.
If the company could pass prices on with no
government appropriam or public outcry, or people
unwilling to buy steel - the steelworkers were home
free.
All they had to do was to hook their wage
increases to their price increases.
That work~d
pretty much through the 50's but began to break
down.
What's happened to the breakdown of that
oligopoly is that its being broken down by domestic
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competition and foreign competition both.
But it's those three elements during those 50 's that
were very powerful elements that affected the
company and everything from there on. That was the
race relations thing and the business of . . .
Incidently Bill Caples and I went to the board of
directors toward the end of the SO's and made a
pitch to the board of directors that we start
bargaining independently. In view of the fact that
the oligopoly was no longer real, and that we could
make a better bargain for Inland Ste.el with our
union than U.S. Steel could with their union. And
our board of directors would not recognize that the
oligopoly was on its way out. 186
Unions and Race
Unions had different positions regarding race relations
'
policies at this time.
A few had mechanisms in place to
counteract discrimination,

others

ignored the

situation . 187

Cassel shared his thoughts as to why this occurred:
In that period of time there were only two or three
unions in the U.S. that were taking a lead, and they
had terrible problems trying to take the lead. One
was the United Autoworkers, under the leadership of
Walter Reuthter; the other was the International
Ladies Garment Workers; and the other union was the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers. 188 But most all the
186
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~For a general discussion of how unions discriminated
against the black worker see generally, William. B. Gould,
Black Workers in White Unions:
Job Discrimination in the
United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
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Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 258-259,
describes UAW's participation in the fight for integrated
housing. ; Jacobson, The Negro and the American Labor Movement,
287, agrees that UAW was an exception. This was due to the
fact that in the early years UAW already had a· large
concentration of blacks. Therefore, they were more sensitive
to "the Negro question."
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other unions felt it was too much of a hot potato
to take on by themselves.
There was no AFL
position.
George Meany felt that the only good
plumber was a white plumber.
Most of the guys that were in the leadership
position of Local 1010 were white guys. There were
beginning to be black guys in leadership. And the
way they got there was through a very peculiar way,
which is why blacks, and hispanics will get power.
Segregation has a reverse twist.
Blacks were
segregated at the dirtiest, lousiest jobs in the
mills - the blast furnace and the coke plant.
I
even interviewed a guy, who had the nerve to tell
me that they put black guys in the coke plant
because they were black! Coal was black, and they
were black! I've had people with the nerve to tell
me to put black guys in the blast furnace, because
blacks stood heat better than other people!
So the union had terrible internal problems.
In
fact, Walter Reuther had an internal revolt because
he tried to make a woman a vice-president of the
United Autoworkers in the 50's.
So how energetic
were they? They were as energetic as the blacks who
had achieved power were.
Now this is how they achieved power.
By being
segregated in the blast furnace they developed
longevity and as they got longevity they developed
knowledge and power inside the union.
So the
dirtiest, lousiest department like the coke plant,
and the open-hearth and the blast furnace were
tended to black dominated by black leadership.
Gradually, they built up their power so that when
they came to meetings they were able to be vocal.
When Walter Reuther, President of the UAW, resigned from
the
AFL-CIO's
Executive
Council,
he
criticized
the
Federation's failure in developing policies and practices
regarding civil rights.
He felt Meany was not committed in
leading the AFL in this area and stated his leadership as
being "the complaisant custodians of the status quo."
Emil Mazey, Secretary-Treasurer of the UAWU, resigned
from the Civil Rights Committee of the AFL, saying it too had
not done justice in eliminating racist practices in organized
labor. ( 356)
For a discussion as to why the ACWU and UAW were
considered to be progressive also see, Richard A. Lester, As
Unions Mature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958),
89-95.
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They were the ones who were vocal and the ones who
began to make the point. 189
Many of the unions had discriminatory policies.

In a

study conducted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
between

July

practices,
They

1,

four

were:

1965

and

June

30,

1968

regarding

specific discriminatory patterns

( 1)

no

duty

of

discriminatory seniority lists;

fair
(3)

union

emerged.

representation; 190

(

2)

segregated locals, and;

(4) exclusion of blacks from craft unions and apprenticeship

programs . 191
later years,

Even though this study was not conducted until
Cassel spoke about how the unions failed to

represent minority employees.

When asked whether employees

approached the union for representation, he responded:
Yes.
And very frequently the local didn't handle
them. I can give you two antidotes.
One in case of a woman and one in case of a black
who both came to see me when I was downtown, running
industrial relations for the corporation. Both with
identical stories, that they had taken their
grievances against the management to the union and
could get no satisfaction and said to me "Will you
give us satisfaction?" The case of the woman was
a rape case. And I gave her as much help as I could
to get legal assistance to bring the charges that
she felt she should be bringing. She couldn't even
get the attorney, the county attorney to pay
attention to her.
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When a union is the exclusive bargaining representative
for employees it is obligated to represent and process
grievances on behalf of the members of that bargaining unit.
191

Benjamin W. Wolkinson, Blacks, Unions,
(Lexington, MA: o.c. Heath & Co., 1973) 5.

and the EEOC
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The black guy had a
simple case of being
discriminated against on the job. And so I called
up the union and asked them to come in and I had
the funny situation of being the mediator, between
the union and the worker. And I did tell them that
they would have lot of trouble in the future if they
didn't start handling these cases. But they ignored
the cases as much as they could.m
Based on this historical evidence Cassel responded to the
issue

of

a

slow

and

gradual

turnaround

in

the

use

of

minorities in union management:
It was very, very gradual .
It came around when
there were a sufficient number of black guys in the
union leadership. And that would have been in the
'60's. Then the Hispanic guys would have somebody
to go to. But there was nobody in the early years
to go to.
It was really pretty awful if you stop
to think about it. 193
Inland continued to respond to the government, union and
its

employees.

The

environment

changed

White

rapidly.

workers hostility towards blacks continued to grow, caused in
part,

by their

resources
tension.

fear

policies

of

job competition.

evolved

in

the

midst

Inland' s
of

this

racial

The success of these policies was due to individuals

such as Caples and upper management's support.
turn, was able to stand by his people.
were

human

instituted

were

advanced

for

Caples, in

The programs which

their

times

and

were

successful because they did receive the needed support from
top management.
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Corporate Social Policy
In the early 1960's, when the Civil Rights Movement was
gaining momentum,

some companies voluntarily began taking

affirmative steps towards developing policies and programs to
assist them in integrating their workforce.
of these companies.

Inland, is one

In order to see how a company got to

where it is today, one must take a look at its past.
Inland began taking affirmative action194 and providing
equal employment for minorities for minorities and women long
before

the

Civil

discrimination

Rights

clauses

Act
were

of

1964

found

was

in

enacted.

almost

all

Nonlabor

agreements beginning in 1962, but at least one was included
as early as

1954. ~

1

Article III, Section 4, of Inland's 1954

labor agreement with Local 1010 and Local 64 stated:
It is the continuing practice of both the Company
and the Union that there shall be no discrimination
against any employee because of race, color,
religious, belief or national origin. 196
Inland's

corporate

earlier than the 1960's.

policies

did

in

fact

begin

much

In 1964 Inland was one of eleven

194

Affirmative action are affirmative steps which are
taken beyond compliance to ensure there are remedies to
eliminate discrimination.
For example:
career development
programs, training in management skills and recruiting at
predominantly minority universities.
19

5Marshall, The Negro and Organized Labor, 187.

Agreement Between Inland steel Company and United
Steelworkers of America Local Union No. 1010 and Local Union
No. 64" Article III, Section 4, (Indiana Harbor, IN and
Chicago Heights, IL, July 1, 1954), 4.
19611
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steel companies which signed and developed a
Progress."

"Plans

for

The company proceeded to develop programs and

policies with which to increase the minority representation
in the workforce.
In the steel industry, minority representation in the
skilled jobs was extremely low.
through apprenticeship

These positions were filled

programs.~'

In order to enter such a

program tests had to be passed and certain requirements had
to be met.

In 1967,

Inland became one of

companies which conducted a pilot program to "

seven steel
. . lift the

worker's educational levels to enable them to qualify for
training and job opportunities when available. 11198 The program
was in cooperation with the USWA and the federal government.
The program was directed towards:
. . • unemployed persons who might be hired for job
openings available in the steel industry, but . .
• do not meet the current educational or, perhaps
the physical standards for acceptance that have been
established by the companies.
The second group are those who are already employed
but who appear to be "locked in" at a certain level of
educational development. Many of these individuals have
voluntarily passed up job promotions when such were
offered, or have been promoted to a better job only to
find that they could not perform, because they could not
read, or write well enough or do required arithmetic.
Others have found occupational progression impossible
because they speak a language other than English. 199

See, for example, United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
197

198

Northrup, Negro Employment In Basic Industry, 328.

199

Ibid.
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In 1971 Inland received a $1.6 million grant from the
government to institute a JOBS Training Program in which
hardcore, unemployed people were trained.

In addition to this

Inland also developed programs for minority engineers and
technical students whereby financial assistance was awarded
to students going into these areas.
Inland was committed in the affirmative action area, as
shared by Bill Dillon:
The Blocks were very socially oriented people. Part
of the whole philosophy was that before Civil Rights
was popular they had that basic thrust of a
management philosophy in which they gave everybody
equal opportunity. 200
Some people are more progressive than others, but the
question remains,

why and how does this happen.

Dillon

believed an individual's personal values and ethics could not
be separated from their work ethic.

In describing the Block

family, he stated:
I don't know where it really comes from, but it was
just that everyone dealt with - Joe Block, Bill they all dealt with -they all had that very basic
thrust, and they expected way before Civil Rights
became popular - they expected their management
people to be involved in civic and things.
They
were always encouraging us to do that sort of thing
- to be involved. It was just something that they
felt that way and they did it. 201
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Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago,

201

Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago,

IL.
IL.

106
Inland's Human Resources Policies
Inland had personnel policies in place for many years,
some

of

which

were

negotiated

with

the

union.

Dillon

commented:
What you had with the union like this was that it
was all negotiated. Most of those benefits - so you
didn't really have a lot of leeway with respect to
those benefits. They were negotiated - the insurance
package, the pension package, the money package the incentives - all of that ...
What we really had was the non-discrimination in
employment aspect of it. Those were solid policies
all the way back. And that is why when we got up
to the 70's that was probably the most striking one
of all. I worked in employment and I knew even in
those days it was the br~nging in of people. There
were plenty of jobs and everything was expanding. 202
Executive Order 11246 203 was one of the executive orders
which was issued during 1965.

One of the provisions in this

executive order is that all federal contractors with federal
contracts greater than $10,000 must have an affirmative action
plan. 20•

Dillon commented on

Inland's affirmative action

program:
It has been a commitment. When I was there we had
a very solid affirmative action program.
Where
every year I was secretary and every year, every
department has to come in and give their AAP showing
us where they were last year; where they are this
year; and if there has been no improvement, why
hasn't there been any improvement.

402
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Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319, as amended
by Executive Order 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303.
3

~ Executive

204

Executi ve Order 11246

§

202
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We sat down with the heads of every operation, with
the Chief Executive there, and with the top
management guys that was part of the annual
management review.
The EEO numbers were part of
that and I'm sure it still is.~
5

Inland was already known to have instituted internal
development programs.

Cassel talked about a community program

which Inland supported during the 1960s:
When I was in Washington from 66-69 I was in charge
of the Poverty Program, Youth Corp, Job Corp.
We
sent a young man, Roger Wilkins, to Chicago to talk
to Mayor Daly about starting a Job Corp program here
in Chicago. I was told to come up here and help him
to try and get in to see the Mayor.
Well, we
finally did, but the Mayor was barely civil.
We
left there and went back to the Sherman Bar and
said, "You know what we can do?
Let's us have a
really terrific Job Corp program for people.
Why
don't we have a really good job program." So I got
a hold of Bill Barry who was head of the Urban
League and I got a hold of Joe Block and said we
need people at this Sunday Morning meeting. We've
got to have a Jobs Now Program for the kids.
By
God, at the Sherman hotel we had a whole room full
of people. Joe Block got them there, business men,
and Bill Barry got businessmen and other there and
we had the first Jobs Now Program started there.
The point of the story is that I got terrific help
all the way on this.
All the way Inland was
interested in these things. 206
Inland had a
company
program.

proved

long history of ci vie involvement.

successful

in

establishing

the

Job

The
Corp

Such success dates back to 1955 when Edward Ryerson

the Chairman of the Board for Inland was chosen as the first
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recipient of the annual Community Service award which was
instituted by the Chicago Chapter of the Public Relations
society of America. 20 '
award. 20•
to

a

In 1966 Inland was the recipient of the

This was the first time such an honor was bestowed

corporation rather than

to

an

individual.

Inland

continued other programs such as underwriting scholarships for
minority students and developing joint programs with other
companies to support the community.
Inland:

The Maverick

For many years Inland has had the reputation of being a
"maverick."

Fighting for what the management believed in, be

it fighting against wage increases or pensions; win or lose,
gained the respect of both unions and its peers.
McDonald,

United

Steelworkers

described Inland as:

Union

President

David
in

1953

the maverick of the steel

"

industry, an independent company with individual attitudes. 209
Inland developed the reputation of being a "maverick" by not
being a follower, but a leader.

Bill Dillon shared his views

of why Inland was given the name:
In my experience with them - they always used to say
"There's plucky old Inland." Abel used to tease us
at the end. "Plucky old Inland, finally ..• "

20

'Ralph Campbell, "Employing the Disadvantaged: Inland
Steel's Experience," Issues in Industrial Society 1 (1969):
35.
201

20

Ibid.

9McDonald, Union Man, 304.
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We were kind of a maverick in the sense that we got
that reputation.
Because you have U.S. Steel and
Bethlehem and Republic. They were the big three and
they made most of the major decisions in bargaining.
And you would have Allegheny Ludlum, Youngstown,
they would go along with what the big three wanted.
They didn't fight them.
At Inland We were always
. if we didn't agree with the trend we were
always fighting for "You shouldn't do this, you
shouldn't do that." So that is where the idea of
Inland being the "Maverick" was.
Know we didn't
have that much of an impact on the big three - U.S.
Steel, Bethlehem, Republic - did almost what they
wanted, but they had to keep the group together.
So you had a certain amount of bargaining power.
And what you do in those kind of bargaining stuff,
is what you' re trying to do is protect yourself.
You know U.S. Steel, Bethlehem and those guys, are
going to do what they want, but you always gotta
know, this is what they're going to do, but how is
this going to impact me. So when I talk about this
fighting, arguing with them, you were always trying
to say, o. k. we do this, this is the impact on
Inland. Lets do it a different way so that Inland
doesn't get stuck.
Abel always used to say in the end - "Oh geez, we
finally got plucky old Inland to sign." But you see
we were willing to challenge U.S. Steel and
Bethlehem.
Bill Caples and my predecessors and
everything. And that is really what you are looking
at in coordinated bargaining is to say how does this
impact Inland differently so that we don't get
banged with it. And they would bang us just as easy
as they could. If we had some cost advantage over
them - they would say what the hell are you talking
about you're about to blow us in total employment
costs.
We're giving you the protection of a nostrike and you're just fighting.
That was always our role.
You had to be very
careful because just like in the EEOC, they didn't
care what it cost Inland.
But I think a lot of those guys at US Steel and
Bethlehem admired us.
We were mavericks in the
sense in the EEO area.
I'll always
remember when
I
was Divisional
Supervisor when the new galvanized lines came in.
We had the old galvanized lines, which was the
hardest job where you had sheet of steel and to dip
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them in zinc by hand. A lot of these people were
lowly educated minorities, mostly a lot of hispanic
and black guys.
When the newest stuff started
coming in, the continuous stuff, a lot of the guys
would say those guys can't do this, we've got to
bring in educated people to run these lines.
And
we said that is a bunch of hooey. These guys have
been running galvanized lines and they've got
seniority rights for these jobs and we're going to
train them to do the job. We never had any trouble.
I remember the open hearth jobs, dirty, tough,
heavy, high paying work, but you had a lot of
minorities in those jobs, and when the new basic
oxygen furnaces came in, we had the Japanese helping
us with the technical end, and they couldn't believe
that we were going to take the "Old Timers" and put
them on these sophisticated equipment.
They said
it just can't be done.
In Japan they would never
think of that. So that in a sense that was one of
the aspects that I remember. The equal employment
type of thing that was to go ahead and push these
guys.
So this is why when we looked at those numbers this
60-20-20 [60% white, 20% hispanic, 20% black] came
about, because that had been the philosophy long
before. This was in the 50's so when you looked at
the numbers 20 years later, the
numbers were
there. 210
Bill Lowry, who in 1990 was still Director of Personnel
and Recruitment,

reiterated the

fact

that management was

responsible for Inland achieving such a reputation.
Caples was a part of that team.

William

Lowry remarked:

One year Inland resisted in raising prices, when the
industry did.
"Plucky old Inland."
We gained
respect.
A lot of that has got to [go to] Bill
[Caples]. Bill did a lot in identifying and hiring
bright people.
Inland was one of the first to go out and formally
do college recruiting back in 1949.
Clarence
Randall started this. Inland demonstrated that kind
210

IL.
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of awareness very early in the game.
Their
participatory management style was somewhat new.
Inland to me seemed to me to be a company with a
conscience.
And they tried to make their
environment heal thy, so their company could be
healthy. 211
The participatory management style was but one of the
factors which made Inland successful with the community and
its employees.
why

the

Frank Cassel gives an in-depth analysis as to

labor-management

confrontational

relationship

to becoming more

went

from

accommodating.

He

being
also

points out that their race relations policies was one of the
reasons the company was considered a maverick.

To this he

replied:
Lets go back to the three points I made earlier.
A maverick partly because of the race relations, the
early efforts there.
A maverick because it more
frequently in the industry tried to induce a
different pricing policy on steel.
Was it ever successful?
No.
You have the
appearance of being a maverick, but not the reality.
What people outside of Inland felt, was the high
quality
of
labor-management
relationship
of
accommodation,
which was considered maverick.
Because so many other employers, were pursuing
outright hostility.
What I realize, that also in
this period, there is a great deal of history here,
that tells you how we got where we were.
After World War II we had a large number of strikes
in the U.S., and those strikes, they usually occur
after the
war,
because the
rules
and the
relationships are usually suspended during wars.
Then after wars, are loosened up. There were also
something the during the war called the War Labor
Board.
And they imposed some conditions on the
steel companies that they didn't like, including
maintenance of membership, which is a form of union
211
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shop. So the companies were ready for a fight after
World War II. Not only in steel, but everywhere.
And the unions were on the upswing.
The unions
basically reached their peak in membership as a
percentage of the labor force in 1953-54. And they
were very, very aggressive and on the make.
The
companies on the other hand, were equally obtuse.
And it took the Little Steel Firms, like Inland,
Republic and Jones and Laughlin and Youngstown Sheet
& Tube, it took them by surprise when U.S. Steel
Corp. signed a recognition agreement to steelworkers
with John L. Lewis, who was head of the Mineworkers,
and who had founded the Steelworkers Organizing
Committee which succeeded the Amalgamated Iron &
Steel & Tin Workers Union.
So Little Steel was
very, very hostile, and that included Inland. And
at that time, the Republic Massacre occurred on the
south side of Chicago, and that was between Chicago
policeman and workers from Republic Steel.
So
Inland broke out of that pattern, broke out of the
Little Steel pattern.
Industrial Relations were much more rational in the
sense than in the other Little steel companies, were
much more like U.S. Steel. By the time we and U.S.
Steel began talking about Industrial relations, we
were thinking much more alike.
In fact, I was a
member of a three or four man committee strategy
team for the whole industry to determine our
strategy. One was U.S. Steel, one was Inland and
the other was Republic, and one guy from Bethlehem.
And we used to spend our days and weeks, plotting
the strategies for each negotiation. But the major
of their respect for Inland, was the fact we had
membership on the committee that assisted a hundred
steel companies. There were a 100 steel companies
and twelve big ones. A little later Henry Kaiser
dropped out and there became 11 big ones. Now there
are only about six.
But, Inland was thought a maverick in the community
because it took seriously participation and serious
problems. We were very early in inviting people to
talk to our executives about how to deal with gang
problems in Chicago.
I became a member of the Urban League when the Urban
League could have met in a telephone booth, and it
was called a Communist organization in those days.
So there I was representing Inland Steel at the
Urban League. There were no other companies. We
had very good rapport with our top guys and the top
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guys were Randall and Joe Block.
Inland helped me when I was in Washington, to get
a very early version of the Job Corp underway. It
was an experimental project here in Chicago and then
we got it through Congress. Inland helped me get
Roger Bough into my office to make an agreement with
U.S. Steel Corporation, with the government to have
to hire something 2-3000 or 10,000 - whatever the
number was a year, disadvantaged young persons minorities. Inland helped me get those connections.
I couldn't have knocked down the door and gotten
Roger Blough to come by myself. And my boss, who
was Secretary of Labor, couldn't do it·.
We saw the role of the company in a much larger
context.
I wanted to mention something that's
happened in defining what people do.
The human
resources term came alive in private industry in the
1970's, but it really originated in government back
in the 60's.
When we were talking about it as a
governmental function involving human resources on
a very massive scale.
And what they did was
bastardized the term.
And the idea of the human
resources function was to cut out the union
relationship. It's the mechanism for turning people
around, so when they think of the function, they
don't think of industrial relations, they think of
human resources. Industrial relations includes an
interaction of an outer environment or a secondary
or tertiary, primary outer impact on the internal
environment of the firm. The Inland internal firm,
was profoundly affected, more than other firms, by
the outer environment. Partly because of the top
people; partly because of the people they hired;
partly because of interest; partly because the times
were changing; and we think we want to change. But
there is no denying the fact, that the external
environment was a powerful inf 1 uence on what we were
trying to do. The company loaned me to the governor
doing the first unemployment report in the country.
This loan program I did in 1962 or 63, and companies
weren't really doing this then. 212
Inland, justifiably so, gained the recognition of being
a "maverick."

The guidance and support which people such as

mFrank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston,
IL.
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William Caples, never faltered.

The confidence the company

displayed in making decisions resulted in admiration from its
peers.
The relationship between employees, union and management
did not begin to improve until after the arrival of Caples in
1945.

Inland's new management new that it would have to hire

people such as Caples to develop the industrial relations
department.
its

race

In order for it to be successful in developing
relations

policies

and

improving

the

union

relationship, it needed to identify people who were equally
committed

to

their

goals.

They

found

it

in

Caples'

leadership, because he in turn hired others who shared that
vision.

CHAPTER 6
CORPORATE CULTURE
A
pattern
of
basic
assumptions--invented,
discovered, or developed by a given group as it
learns to cope with its problems of external
adaptation and internal integration--that has worked
well enough to be considered valid and therefore,
to be taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those
problems. 213
In the last several years corporations have been showing
a

greater

interest

in

the

subject

of

corporate

Studying a culture itself is not unique.
study people

in

order to

learn more

culture.

Anthropologists

about their values,

beliefs and the society in which they live.

These values and

beliefs form a culture of society and corporations.
In

Kochan's

model

regarding

the

development

of

an

industrial relations system, the external environment also
plays a major role in how a corporate culture is developed.
In both instances the external business or social environment

is a great influence behind the evolution of either the
culture or industrial relations system.

Even though the

mEdger H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership
(San Francisco: Jessey-Bass Inc., 1984) 9.
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external environment plays a large role in defining what the
culture or industrial system will be, the underlying factor
is

that both

corporation.

of

these

are

shaped

by the

leader

of

the

To put this in a better perspective Figure 2

describes Schein's three levels of culture.
Artifacts and creations, Level 1, is the most visible
level of culture.

This level is the physical and social

environment of the corporation.

The outside world's opinion

of a company's culture, is formed by their perception of what
they see at this level.
Culture reflects an individual or groups original values,
Level

2.

These

values

are

derived

not

only

from

an

individual's own values, Level 3, but also from the external
physical and social environment, Level 1.

Individuals are

still aware of their values at Level 2, but they will draw
from Level 1 and Level 3 when making a decision or leading a
group of individuals.

As values become more ingrained in an

individual, they drop into the subconscious, becoming Level
3, Basic Assumptions.
from

our

relationships

These basic assumptions are derived
with

other

people

and

also

from

tradition.
Culture reflects the values and assumptions by which
decisions are made.
the

individuals

In order to have a strong organization,

making

these

decisions

organization's beliefs, values and vision.

should

share

the

Upon examining
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Figure 2
Levels of Culture and Their Interactions 214
Level 1:

Artifacts and Creations

Technology

Visible but
often not
decipherable

Art
Visible and audible behavior patterns
/\

Level 2:

Values

Testable in the physical environment

Greater level
of
awareness

Testable only by social consensus

,,
Level 3:

Basic Assumptions

Relationship to environment
Nature of reality, time and space
Nature of human nature
Nature of human activity
Nature of human relationships

214

Schein' 14.

Taken for
granted
Invisible
Preconscious
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culture more closely, one finds that leaders play a critical
role in shaping the culture.

If necessary, a good leader can

successfully change the culture of a company so that it can
better

meet

environment.
certain

the

needs

of

the

external

and

internal

Successful leaders have been found to have

skills

and

traits.

Figure

3

summarizes

characteristics found in a such a leader.

Figure 3
Traits and Skills Found Most
Frequently to be Characteristic of
Successful Leaders
215

TRAITS

SKILLS

Adaptable to solutions
Alert to social environment
Ambitious and achievement
oriented
Assertive
Cooperative
Decisive
Dependable
Dominant (desire to
influence others)
Energetic (high activity
level)
Persistent
Self-confident
Tolerant of stress
Willing to assume responsibility

Clever (intelligent)
Conceptually skilled
Creative
Diplomatic and tactful
Fluent in speaking
Knowledgeable about
group tasks
Organized (administrative
ability)
Persuasive
Socially skilled

mDavid R. Hampton, Charles E. Summer and Ross A. Webber,
Organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management
(Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1987), 556.
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Inland Steel had strong leaders defining and molding its
culture.

In describing Clarence Randall, President of Inland

Steel from 1949-1953 and then Chairman of the Board from 19531959; and Joe Block President from 1953-1959, Cassel recalls:
A great deal of these [trying to develop better
union relations and equal employment opportunity]
efforts got started under Randall, who preceded
Block and as a matter of fact, he selected Joe Block
as his successor.
And Randall had an important
character in this whole thing because of the
evolution of his psyche, his personality.
He had
started out being the strongest anti-union leader
in the industry , absolutely opposed to the union
shop. He was a - he came to the company originally
as a relatively rural lawyer from Ishpeming
Michigan.
He had been trained in the law at
Harvard, was born and raised in Cherry Valley, New
York. A man who continuously evolved throughout his
life. And I think that two things that influenced
him that influenced Inland, one was his service in
Washington, with Eisenhower, where he came in
contact with the bigger issues and the bigger
problems of the world outside of Inland Steel, after
all he was his Economic Advisor. And he got to see
how important these issues were.
Remember, that
was from 52-58. And I observed in him an enlarged
vision of the world. He wrote three or four books
during that period of time. But he was the guy that
Bill Caples on board, he brought me on board. But
I don't underestimate the influence of the Blocks
ethical values. Very high ethical values. You know
its interesting, they are very consistent people.
We ran into his daughter, and even today, they are
involved in all the liberal causes.
But
Joe
Block
couldn't
touch
Randall
for
intellectual candle power. Randall had it. And he
thought about all of these issues. He's the guy who
thought a lot about these issues. He's the guy who
thought consciously about changing the industrial
relations policy of the firm.
From outright
hostility to something like accommodation. This is
a big jump, because you have to train the whole
workforce.
Because this involves thousands of
people - as a matter of fact I used to go out in the
mills and talk to the guys I worked with. After I
got downtown I'd go back to the mill and they'd say,
"What's wrong with the old man, did he get taken
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when he went down to Washington? There's something
wrong with this guy. He's got all these left wing
views since he came back from Washington. "
Left
wing views from Eisenhower, can you imagine? They
would trust me, they knew I wouldn't spill the
beans. And he was very far advanced over everybody.
In other words, if you talk about a push - pull
effect, Randall was the pull effect.
Of pulling
that organization along into the 20th century, in
technology, and in planning, and in race relations.
All of those things, he was the pull effect.
I remember he was very stern about having a plank
to
integrate
the
workforce.
He
fired
a
superintendent in one of the mills because he
wouldn't come up with a plan. Randall was the first
man to early adopt the ideas on having a planned
succession of executives and so forth. Long before
anybody else had. This man really had capability.
Block carried out a lot of that, but not with the
same flair or enthusiasm.
It's an interesting
thing, he had more of the feel of what the problems
of the human race than Randall.
Randall had a
better intellectual comprehension of what to do.
Block had more feelings. The Block couldn't escape
the antecedents of their family and everything that
goes into the life of the Jew who had connections
with somebody who may have been in the holocaust or
something.
Randall was a cold blooded intellect who said, these
are things that have got to happen. We have to have
free trade, we can't be fooling around with all this
goddamn protectionism.
Block wouldn't have said
that in a 100 years. Block went along with the rest
of the guys on protectionism.
We were the guys that were the instruments that were
brought along, we were the guys brought in - given
the green light.
And we were not the guys who
dreamed up the policy. The policy was there.
With Randall there was something new everyday. He
took on top issues.
He took problems.
He was
wiling to work with the rest of the industry up to
a point.
He even acted as industry spokesman
sometimes, but he had his own mind. Randall was a
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great orator. 316
As much as a corporation needs a leader to form a culture
it needs people to help it achieve success.

Culture will get

more deeply embedded and will perpetuate itself, through the
individuals that are hired.

According to Dillon, Clarence

Randall hired quality people:
He was given the credit for what we used to call the
"Randall's Rangers." He had an approach that for
steel you had to have top level management material,
so every year Inland would recruit seven, eight,
nine people, from the top schools, Northwestern,
etc. - to get young talented guys put into these
training programs to feed them into the management
development system, so that you would have this top
potential talent. And that proved very successful
in those days that almost all of the guys came up
to the top levels with Inland.
So it was a very
successful program. As far as getting the caliber
of guys you needed for the top management level of
the company.
It was a very successful program, a lot of the
people came through it. When I was at Inland, they
were still bringing in a lot of very good people.
They had guys like Barry Sullivan.
They got some
very good people that way.
This was one of Randall's programs and this is why
we called them "Randall's Rangers. 11217
In

analyzing

leadership

thus

far,

one

of

the

major

characteristics is the relationships which arise between the
leader, his/her followers, the organization and the internal
and

external

environment.

mFrank Cassel,
Evanston, IL.
211

IL.

Going

Interview,

on

one

step

October

further,

4,

1989,

the

in

Bill Dillon, Interview on September 9, 1989, Chicago,
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foundation of these relationships all deal with people.
good leader will place a high value on people.

A

Clarence

Randall wrote:
If your organization is run "by the book," if the
job description is more important than the man, if
organization charts take precedence over the
realities
of
personal
relationships,
your
organization is in danger of succumbing to an all
too common form of creeping paralysis.m
Randall's

personal

business

ethics,

responsibility.
that

they

should

ethics
from

and

his

values
labor

did

influence

policies

to

his

social

His feeling regarding labor policies were
not

be

formulated

by

lawyers,

but

by:

thoughtful
management
after
weighing
law,
psychology, economics, and human values .
. no
individual will be permitted to substitute his own
set
of
prejudices
for
the
institutional
philosophy. 219
Randall firmly believed that the human resources function
was important to a corporation,

and did take the external

environment into account when steering the company's course.
The evolution of the labor relations policies reflect his
values.

The individuals he hired, such as William Caples,

shared his beliefs and vision.
company from

confrontation to

They were able to move the
cooperation with

the USWA,

because they had his support.

mclarence B. Randall, The Folklore
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1959), 12.
ll9Ibid.
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of

Mana9ement,

CONCLUSION
The

history of

the

steel

industry's

labor-management

relations and race relations policies is cha.racterized by the
turbulent period of the late 1800's when strikes were due to
economics and quite frequently were violent.

By the 1960's

the violence remained, but this time it was related to civil
rights.

The

government

anq

steel

industry

were

experiencing a metamorphosis during these years.

equally

The course

of events were consequently due to the changes in working
conditions, technology and new legislation.
Legislation which was passed during this time period went
from being pro-union to pro-company

The government also went

to the extreme of taking a hands-off approach to seizing the
steel mills.

The New Deal labor policies legitimized the

union and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proved to be the most
important

anti-discrimination

piece

of

legislation

to

be

enacted.

A later chapter between the unions and companies

could read that their relationship went from confrontation to
cooperation.
The environment created by World War I and II opened the
door for the integration of the workforce.
123

The labor shortage
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forced companies to hire women and minorities for work in the
factories.

Unions, needing to increase their membership, were

compelled to seek the black worker's support.

Once this

occurred, unions and companies had to develop new policies to
address the inequalities which existed between the white and
black worker.
Title VII finally made unions and companies accountable
for their race relations policies and the integration of the
workforce.

The legislation which was passed prior to 1964

did not prove to be effective.

The black workers had no

recourse

redress ·for

with

discrimination

which
they

to

seek

confronted

in

the

the

racial

employment

sector.

Unions were equally at fault by allowing segregated locals
and

discriminatory

seniority

and

collective bargaining agreements.

promotion

provisions

in

But once created, policies

were only successful when there was someone to support them.
The evolution of Inland Steel's labor-management and race
relations policies evolved during these very tumultuous times
in the country's history.

In 1938 the Chicago Memorial Day

Massacre was fresh in everyone's minds and the management at
Inland was considered to be "ruthless" and "dictatorial." 2 m
Later,

in 1954,

declared

Brown v.

segregation

in

Board of

Education,

public

education

unconstitutional and the Civil Rights era gained

220

effectively

Whyte, Pattern for Industrial Peace, 157.

to

be

momentum.
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A corporation's
the

internal

environment.

management policies are determined by

and

external

pressures

created

Such

pressures

are

times

control of management.
such

as

the

often

by

the

beyond

the

There are many extraneous factors,

fluctuating

labor

market,

technological

and

economic changes which affect the development of policies.
None of these factors, particularly governmental pressures,
can be easily changed by management.

Given these constraints,

the fact remains that the top management of many companies was
able to alter race employment patterns.
an example.

Inland Steel was such

Individuals such, as William Caples and Clarence

Randall left this type of legacy behind.
ensued were not only a
environment,

but

were

The changes which

response to the changing external
also

due

to

the

commitment

upper

management had to its workforce.
In

1954

Inland

Steel

introduced major

modifications in the plants.
to

lead

to

the

displacement

technological

These changes invariably began
of

senior

employees. 221

The

president, concerned with how these changes were effecting
the older employees, informed his management that he wanted
them to develop programs which could provide alternatives
which would minimize the displacement.

Management decided

mFrank
Cassel,
"Corporate
Manpower
Planning
and
Technical Change at the Plant Level" (Amsterdam: Adjustment
of Workers
to Technical Change
at the Plant Level
International
Conference,
November
15-18,
1966),
4,
photocopied.
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the best approach was to develop training programs which would
upgrade employees skills.

The company continues to conduct

training programs for their employees both at the plant and
in conjunction with Purdue University.

In addition, Inland

executives and supervisors also receive training in planning,
leadership skills, team building, group problem solving and
worker participation. 222
Further proof of Inland' s commitment to equal opportunity
dates prior to the passage of Title VII.

Inland was one of

the companies which had voluntarily developed a
Progress."

"Plans for

It was during this period the company instituted

training programs for the black worker and began minority
recruitment programs.

The minority recruitment programs which

are conducted at such universities as Howard and Florida A &
M, are still in existence.

In 1984 thirteen percent of their

newly hired college graduates were minorities.u 3
programs such as this,

Recruitment

are the result of Randall's program

known as "Randall's Rangers."
In addition to recruitment and training programs, Inland
has also continued the legacy of community involvement.
1984 their foundation contributed $1, 573, 905. 224

In

Of this money

forty-five percent was contributed to the United Way Community

222

Inland Steel, Inland Steel 1984 Annual Report (Chicago:
Inland Steel, 1984), 15.
223

22

Ibid.

'Ibid.

I

16.
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Funds and thirty-six percent to educational institutions and
scholarship

programs.

scholarships

given

The
to

minority

engineering and technology.
to

community

activities,

welfare
such

scholarship

the

students

involve

majoring

in

The remainder of the money goes

agencies;

as

programs

local

National

and

national

Association

civic

for

the

Advancement of Colored People and the National Urban League;
and cultural organizations and hospitals.

such programs and

community involvement were begun under Randall's and Caples
regime, and continue today.
Both

the

labor-management

integration

of

the

workforce

were

individuals

such as William Caples

relationship
finally

the

and

solidified

by

and Clarence Randall.

Randall had the foresight to see the need for an industrial
relations department.

When he hired William Caples, he hired

someone who was committed to fair employment and willing to
take risks.
If a company is to survive it cannot close itself off
from the world and complacently carry on its affairs.

It is

inseparable from the events occurring in the world.

The

corporation experiences what the world is experiencing.

The

two are intertwined and each must respond to the needs of the
other.

Inland Steel responded to the events which were taking

place.
The

"Bill

Caples"

of

Inland

began

developing

relations policies before it was mandated by law.

race

Inland was

128

one

of

the

few

companies

which

incorporated

the

anti-

discrimination clause in their labor contracts as early as
The company was also excluded from the Steel Consent

1954.

Decree

which

Opportunities

was

signed

Commission

with

in

Equal

the

By

1974.m

this

Employment
time,

the

policies Inland implemented after 1945 had been in place long
enough for the company to have a more representative workforce
in nearly all occupations.

In 1986 Inland's workforce was

thirteen percent women, eighteen percent black and sixteen
Hispanic. 226

percent

During

this

same

year

industry's employment characteristics were:
women,

ten

percent

black

and

eight

the

steel

thirteen percent

percent

Hispanic. 227

Inland's company magazine states:
" . . . we believe that growth and profitability must
be accomplished by other goals if we are to fulfill
our obligations to the society we serve. Foremost
among these objectives is providing an environment
of equal opportunity in hiring, development and
advancement . 228
These

statistics

statement.

The

reflect
fact

Inland's

Inland' s

commitment

internal

to

this

representation

is

225

For a list of the companies included in the Steel
Consent Decree and the provisions of the Decree, see pp. 6870 below.
226

Inland Steel, 1986 Inland Steel Fact Book (Chicago:
Inland Steel, 1986), 1.
227

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employed Civilians by
Detail Industry, Sex, and Race (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
January, 1987), Table 28.
2

1987)

I

~Inland

3.

Steel,

Inland Steel

(Chicago:

Inland Steel,
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greater than the steel industry's is due to the programs which
were instituted between 1949 and 1969 and continue today.

The

training

the

and

development

programs

have

promotional opportunities for minorities.

increased

These programs, in

addition to the company's hiring practices, have thus resulted
in the increase of minority internal representation.
this

would

have

occurred

if

there

had

not

None of

been

suitable

management to initiate the needed changes.
The future progress of equal employment opportunity will
continue to depend in part, as it has in the past, upon the
managers commitment to equal

e~ployment

opportunity.

Everyone

operates within certain constraints which are imposed by the
internal

and

external

pressures.

In

turn,

it

is

these

pressures that bear upon the organization and operation of a
business.

As

Kochan's

industrial

relations

model

demonstrates, the external environment, coupled with history
and the values of a company, create an industrial system.
In 1964 Clarence Randall wrote:
The world moves on passing from one area of
turbulence to the next, with the problems of today
steadily yielding place to those of tomorrow. .
For this reason there can never be a neat handbook,
to be kept in a desk drawer, that will give all the
answers . . . success lies in bringing fresh wisdom
to new situations. 229
When Randall hired Caples in 1945, he hired an individual
with wisdom and someone who was innovative and willing to take

229

Clarence Randall, Making Good in Management (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1964), 151.
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risks.

Cassel said in his interview that race relations was

viewed as a

"hot potato" and that not many companies were

willing to address it.

Inland did address it with the help

of people such as Caples and became known as a leader because
of the policies which were instituted between 1945 and 1969.
Due to Bill Caples and the support of upper management these
policies were, and continue to be, successful.
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